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I. OVERVIEW
There is a controversial trend towards privatization of public water
services, not only internationally but also in the United States.' Although
the portion of all public water services in the United States provided by
privately-owned water suppliers is small (about eleven to fifteen percent),2
this portion has increased dramatically over the past two decades, 3 consistent
with political forces and public policies favoring privatization of public
services generally.4 States have enacted statutes expressly authorizing
1. See generally National Research Council, Privatization of Water Services in the United
States: An Assessment of Issues and Experience (Nat'l Acad. of Sci. 2002), available at http://www.
nap.edulbooks/0309074444lhtml/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Peter H. Gleick et al., The New
Economy of Water: The Risks and Benefits of Globalization and Privatization of Fresh Water
(Pacific Inst. for Studies in Dev., Env't & Sec. 2002); Robin A. Johnson et al., Long-term
Contracting for Water and Wastewater Services (2002); Kathy Neal et al., Restructuring America's
Water Industry: Comparing Investor-Owned and Government Water Systems, Reason Pub. Policy
Inst. Policy Study No. 200 (Jan. 1996) (comparing performance of government-owned companies
with investor-owned companies), available at http://www.rppi.org/ps200.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2005); Isabelle Fauconnier, The Privatization of Residential Water Supply and Sanitation Services:
Social Equity Issue in the California and International Contexts, 13 BERKELEY PLANNING J. 37, 52-
53 (1999); Wolfgang Harrer, The Giants of Water: RWE, Vivendi, & Suez, ECOWORLD (Dec. 12,
2002) (discussing water privatization), available at http://www.ecoworld.org/Home/articles2.cfm?
TID=329 (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (describing the reasons behind water privatization); Robert
Vitale, Privatizing Water Systems: A Primer, 24 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1382 (2001).
2. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 2-3, 14-15; REASON PUB. POLICY INST., WATER
SERV., Water Services, available at http://www.privatization.org/database/policyissues/water_local.
html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
3. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1, at 4-5; David L. Correll, Water Industry Catches Wave of
Opportunity, UTIL. BUS., Mar. 30, 1999; Marianne Lavelle et al., The Coming Water Crisis, 133
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 12, 2002, at 22; Jon Luoma, Water for Profit: Contamination,
Riots, Rate Increases, Scandals, MOTHER JONES, Nov. 1, 2002, at 34; John Maggs, The State
Experience, NAT'L J., July 12, 2003; Mort Rosenblum, Is Water A Human Right or a Commodity?,
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2002, at A3.
4. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, PRIVATIZATION: TOWARD MORE
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municipalities and other public entities to contract with private firms to
provide various kinds of water services, and even to sell their waterworks.
5
Large international water companies, and their national and local
subsidiaries, have successfully bid for contracts to provide water services to
a growing number of cities of all sizes.6 And private-market advocates have
released reports stating that privatization of water services is a trend that will
only grow.
At the same time, local citizens' groups, environmental groups, and
others have expressed concern over, and sometimes opposition to,
privatization of public water supplies and services.8 In some cases, public
opposition has defeated proposed privatization arrangements. 9 In other
cases, dissatisfied cities have terminated contracts and/or bought out private
water suppliers. 10  There is no question that water privatization is
controversial. This article examines the issues that arise in privatization of
public water supply services, 11 and recommends how state legislatures can
increase and ensure accountability to the public when cities and local
districts undertake privatization measures.12
There are no simple and easy truths about privatization of water
services, despite rhetoric on both sides of the issue. This area is
characterized by ideological conflicts between economic-theory libertarians
who advocate for private provision of public services on economic
efficiency grounds,' 3 and social-theory statists who advocate for government
EFFECTIVE GOVERNMENT (1988); Cynthia DeLaughter, Comment, Priming the Water Industry
Pump, 37 Hous. L. REV. 1465 (2000); Donald G. Featherstun et al., State and Local Privatization:
An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 643 (2001); Maggs, supra note 3; Shirley L. Mays,
Privatization of Municipal Services: A Contagion in the Body Politic, 34 DUQ. L. REV. 41 (1995).
5. See discussion infra Part III (A).
6. See generally National Research Council, supra note 1; National Association of Water
Companies, Public Water Supply Facts (1999) (information sheet on file with author); United Water,
Public-Private Partnerships (2003) (information sheets on file with author).
7. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 1; Neal, supra note 1; Robin Johnson & Adrian Moore,
Opening the Floodgates: Why Water Privatization Will Continue, Reason Pub. Policy Inst., Policy
Brief 17 (2001), available at http://www.rppi.org/pbriefl7.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). These
reports were issued by the Reason Public Policy Institute, which is one of the most active advocates
for privatization of government services. See also WATER PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL, ESTABLISHING
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR WATER AND WASTEWATER SYSTEMS: A BLUEPRINT FOR
SUCCESS (2003).
8. See discussion infra Part 11 (B) (4).
9. See infra pp. 31-35.
10. See id.
11. See discussion infra Part IV.
12. See discussion infra Part V. This article does not address privatization of wastewater and
sewer systems, or private markets in water supplies themselves, except as directly relevant to
privatization of local water services. This article also does not address global trends towards
privatization of water services and supplies, which are considerably greater than in the United States.
See, e.g., Gleick, supra note 1.
13. See, e.g., TERRY L. ANDERSON & DONALD R. LEAL, FREE MARKET ENVIRONMENTALISM
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provision of public services on public interest grounds. 14
The rhetoric will inevitably lead to bad public policy because
privatization of public water services is neither unqualifiedly beneficial to
the public nor unqualifiedly harmful to the public. The more important
issues involve identifying under what conditions water privatization should
occur and what safeguards and accountability mechanisms should be
provided to protect the public. There are several reasons why the issue is
more nuanced than advocates often reveal.
First, privatization does not have a single meaning.15 Privatization of
public water services is a broad category that encompasses many different
arrangements ranging from outsourcing of specific services like billing or
maintenance, on one end of the spectrum, to private ownership and control
of a city's water facilities and supplies, on the other end of the spectrum.
Certain types of privatization might make sense in some circumstances,
while other types might not.
Second, private provision of public water services is not always more
(1991); David Haarmeyer, Privatizing Infrastructure: Options for Municipal Water Systems, Reason
Pub. Policy Inst., Report No. 151 (1999), available at http://www.rppi.org/ps151.html (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 3-18 (6th ed. 2003);
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 4; E.S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC
SECTOR: HOW TO SHRINK GOVERNMENT (1982); REGULATION AND THE REAGAN ERA: POLITICS,
BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (Roger E. Meiners & Bruce Yandle eds., 1989); THE
PRIVATIZATION PROCESS: A WORLDWIDE PERSPECTIVE (Terry L. Anderson & Peter J. Hill eds.,
1996); PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION (Jack L. Upper & George B.
Baldwin eds., 1995). See also Karen Bakker, Liquid Assets, 29(2) ALTERNATIVES J. 17 (2003),
available at http://www.alterativesjoumal.ca/issues/292/bakker.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2005);
DeLaughter, supra note 4; see also sources cited supra note 7.
14. See, e.g., DAVID CROMWELL, PRIVATE PLANET: CORPORATE PLUNDER AND THE FIGHT BACK
(2001); BARBARA H. FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND
THE FIRST LAW AND ECONOMICS MOVEMENT (1998); GERALD FRUG, CITY MAKING: BUILDING
COMMUNITIES WITHOUT BUILDING WALLS 167-179 (1999); JOEL F. HANDLER, DOWN FROM
BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL
ORTHODOXY (1992); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A
CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 192-203 (1977); Tony Clarke, Water Privateers, 29(2)
ALTERNATIVES J. 10 (2003) available at http://www.altemativesjoumal.ca/issues/292/clark.asp (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005). See also Gleick, supra note 1; Bakker, supra note 13; Fauconnier, supra note
1; Mays, supra note 4; Public Citizen, The Big Greedy: A Background Check on the Corporations
Vying to Take Over New Orleans' Water Systems (Aug. 2001) [hereinafter Public Citizen, The Big
Greedy]; Public Citizen, Water Privatization: A Broken Promise: Case Histories From Throughout
the United States (Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Public Citizen, Broken Promise]; Public Citizen, Thirsting
for Profits: A Background Check on Corporations Vying to Take Over Stockton's Water Supplies
(Oct. 2001) [hereinafter Public Citizen, Thirsting for Profits]; Public Citizen, Reclaiming Public
Assets: From Private to Public Ownership of Waterworks (Sept. 2002) [hereinafter Public Citizen,
Reclaiming Public Assets]; Public Citizen, Water Heist: How Corporations Are Cashing in on
California's Water (Dec. 2003); Public Citizen, The ABCs of Water Privatization,
http://www.citizen.org/documents/PrivatizationABCs_-_Water-forAll.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2005) [hereinafter Public Citizen, ABCs]; Public Citizen, Top Ten Reasons to Oppose Water
Privatization, http://www.citizen.org/cmep/water/general/whyoppose/articles.cfm?ID=7566 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005) [hereinafter Public Citizen, Top Ten Reasons]; Public Citizen, Turning Up the
Tap: How the Private Water Industry Wants to Boost Profits - at the Expense of Taxpayers,
available at http://www.citizen.org/cmep/Water/articles.cfm?ID=l 1882 (last visited Feb. 3, 2005)
[hereinafter Public Citizen, Turning Up the Tap].
15. See infra Part II (B) (2).
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efficient than public provision of public water services. The efficiency is
highly context-specific: it depends on the size and scope of the city's water
service operation; the financial and political condition of the city
government; the potential for changing municipal management and
operations to increase efficiency; the private provider's size, financial
condition, management strengths and weaknesses, operational efficiencies,
experience with similar water systems, and corporate culture; the customers'
consumption patterns; and other factors. The most operationally efficient
outcome for one city may be vastly different for a different city.
Third, operational efficiency does not mean the same thing as
economically optimal.16 Even if a private provider of public water services
could operate with lower operational costs than a public provider, there
might be substantial public costs. These costs may include lesser
environmental protection, greater risk to the security and stability of
municipal water supplies, decreased water quality, and less public input into
the types of desired services.' 7 As many economists note, private markets
do not always reflect or price public values and costs adequately. The
benefits and costs of privatization in particular circumstances have to be
considered broadly, not merely in terms of operational inputs and outputs.
Fourth, private control and provision of public water services are not
always a threat to the public's interests. Likewise, they are not always a
threat to the protection of a resource vital to life, the community, the
environment, and the economy. 18 There are circumstances in which private
supply of public water services can result in lower rates and more reliable
and cleaner drinking water supplies than existing public institutions can
provide.19 Privatization agreements can be subject to safeguards, conditions,
and restrictions that serve to protect the public's interest in water supply and
services.
20
Finally, just because property is private, rather than public, does not
mean that it is not subject to public controls and interests. Studies of
property arrangements in practice in the United States show that the
distinctions between private control and public control are not clear: bright
lines between private and public control over property are more a matter of
theory, ideology, or advocacy by affected interests than a social and legal
reality. 21 Instead, most private property is subject to public controls and
16. See discussion infra Part IV (B).
17. See infra Parts IV (D), (G).
18. See infra Part IV (C), (D), (J).
19. See discussion infra Part IV (C).
20. See discussion infra Part IV (D).
21. See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: Property as a Web of
Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002); ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE:
PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD (2003); WILLIAM JOSEPH SINGER, ENTITLEMENT
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regulation. Also, private property is limited by the rights of the public and
of third parties like neighbors or other property owners. Water, in particular,
is an area in which private interests are substantially limited by public
interests. Private rights in water are limited by state ownership, the public
trust doctrine, permit systems, prohibitions against wasteful use, public
interest criteria, and the rights of other holders of interests in water (e.g.,
other appropriators, other riparian landowners, or other owners of land
overlying underground aquifers).22 These limitations on private ownership
23go back far in history, and serve not only political and social goals but also
optimal economic utility and the system of private property generally.
Thus, private control or even ownership of public water services does
not mean that the private providers cannot or should not be limited by public
controls, regulations, conditions, and rights that ensure accountability to the
public. Evidence from the United States experience with municipal water
privatization offers an important lesson: the critical issue is public
accountability.
Neither absolute prohibitions on privatization nor unlimited
authorization and facilitation of privatization are proper functions of law and
public policy. Instead, law and public policy do serve, and should serve, to
impose limits and conditions on privatization designed to protect the
public's interests. These limits should apply to 1) whether or not to
privatize; 2) under what conditions and circumstances it is permissible
and/or desirable to privatize; 3) whether the operations and results of a
private provider meet expected or required standards; and 4) under what
conditions and circumstances may the parties modify or terminate their
arrangement. This article not only identifies some of the important areas of
water privatization in which accountability is needed, but also recommends
state legislation establishing standards and processes for the approval of
24water service privatization contracts that ensure this needed accountability.
11. THE STATUS OF WATER PRIVATIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES
A. History
Public provision of water services has not always been the dominant
25mode in the United States. While water systems serving the public began
in the mid-1700s in Pennsylvania and Rhode Island, they developed
slowly. 26 By 1850, there were eighty-three such water systems in the United
(2000). Professor Freyfogle offers a particularly thoughtful critique of the privatization of
landscapes. FREYFOGLE, supra note 21, at 157-201.
22. See generally A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES (1993 & Annual
Supp.).
23. Id.
24. See discussion infra Part V.
25. See National Research Council, supra note 1, at 30.
26. Id.
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States, fifty of which were privately owned.27  By 1900, there were more
than 3,000 water systems in the United States to supply water to the public,
with slightly more than one-half of them publicly owned and slightly less
28than one-half of them privately owned. It was only in the first few decades
of the twentieth century that public ownership and provision of water
services became the overwhelmingly dominant mode by which the public
received water.
Several factors contributed to the rise of public provision of municipal
water services in the twentieth century. These factors are important to
understanding the current pendulum swing back towards privatization. First,
urban and suburban population grew, not only in absolute terms but also as a
percentage of the U.S. population. 29  Thus, the percentage of U.S.
households served by their own wells or their own withdrawals from surface
water dropped, and the need for centralized water systems grew.
30
Second, cities grew in power and legal authority in the twentieth
century. Around the turn of the century, cities were constrained by what was
known as "Dillon's Rule," a judicial principle (arising out of concerns over
large cities' corrupt political machines) that denied municipalities any
powers and authorities not expressly granted by the state legislature. 3' Over
time, Dillon's Rule eroded, replaced by liberal judicial interpretation of
municipal authority and state statutory and constitutional recognition of
home rule status for many cities.
32
27. Id.
28. Id. at 30, 34.
29. DENNIS R. JUDD, THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN CITIES: PRIVATE POWER AND PUBLIC POLICY,
13-17, 145, 166 (2d ed. 1984).
30. Id. at 32-34.
31. JOHN DILLON, 1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 448-55 (5th ed. 1911); see also FRUG, supra
note 14, at 45-53.
32. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990 (Cal. 1992); Marshall Field & Co. v. Vill. of S.
Barrington, 415 N.E.2d 1277 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Webster Realty Co. v. City of Fort Dodge, 174
N.W.2d 413 (Iowa 1970); State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980). See generally JUDD,
supra note 29, at 118-40; Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I - The Structure of Local
Government Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1990). In particular, cities have broad authority with
respect to supplying water to the public, including eminent domain power, immunity from antitrust
liability, and discretion to manage urban growth and water availability by enacting water moratoria
or growth moratoria or by rejecting specific development projects. See Town of Hallie v. City of
Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985) (concerning antitrust immunity); Lockary v. Kayfetz, 917 F.2d 1150
(9th Cir. 1990) (holding water moratorium not a per se taking); Associated Home Builders of the
Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976) (finding growth moratorium
dependent on public infrastructure improvements); San Mateo County Coastal Landowners' Ass'n v.
County of San Mateo, 45 Cal. Rptr. 2d 117 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming voter-approved coastal
development plan as a valid exercise of local planning power); Bldg. Indus. Ass'n v. Marin Mun.
Water Dist., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the district was not required to
assess needs of current and potential customers before instituting moratorium); Gilbert v. State, 266
Cal. Rptr. 891 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) (affirming moratorium based upon water supply and quality
concerns); Dateline Builders, Inc. v. City of Santa Rosa, 194 Cal. Rptr. 258 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
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Third, many states authorized special-purpose water districts, which are
public entities having missions, expertise, powers, duties, and sources of
financing that are more narrowly tailored to providing water services than
the typical general-government municipality. Fourth, favorable federal tax
treatment of interest on state and municipal bonds created incentives for
public investment in, and ownership of, basic public utilities.
34
Fifth, many private water suppliers of the late nineteenth century failed
to provide adequate services at reasonable prices. 35  For example, the Los
Angeles City Water Company, a private firm supplying Los Angeles with
water in the last three decades of the nineteenth century, charged high rates
to its customers, failed to provide adequate service (e.g., low pressure and
malfunctioning hydrants), and illegally diverted water to which it was not
entitled, thus making a significant profit at the expense of the public.
36
Likewise, the Spring Valley Water Works, a private firm supplying San
Francisco with water during the same time frame, had difficulty meeting the
high demand for water in the rapidly growing San Francisco area, charged
high rates for poor service, but refused to sell its facilities to the city until the
state legislature mandated city ownership of utilities in San Francisco.
37
(holding that the refusal to connect city sewers to "leapfrog" development was consistent with land
use policies); Swanson v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 128 Cal. Rptr. 485 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976)
(affirming moratorium based upon anticipated future water shortages); City of Thornton v. Farmers
Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 575 P.2d 382 (Colo. 1978) (recognizing eminent domain power); Serpa
v. County of Washoe, 901 P.2d 690 (Nev. 1995) (holding that the denial of a new subdivision based
on county prohibition on new development that is not accompanied by new water sources); First
Peoples Bank of N.J. v. Township of Medford, 599 A.2d 1248 (N.J. 1991) (holding that the sewer
ordinance contained adequate standards and was not implemented arbitrarily); Schofield v. Spokane
County, 980 P.2d 277 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that lot size, rather than density, a valid
criteria in regulating waterfront waste management). See also Richard S. Harnsberger, Eminent
Domain and Water Law, 48 NEB. L. REV. 325 (1969). Water moratoria as mechanisms for growth
control have generally proven ineffective, though. See NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST:
CALIFORNIANS AND WATER: A HISTORY 519 (rev. ed. 2001) (stating that attempts to control growth
through limited water supply have not been successful); Carla Hall, Santa Barbara Opens the Tap to
Builders Development, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1997, at A3 (describing how Santa Barbara's slow-
growth limits on water supplies gave way to new water supplies and an accompanying boom in
development); A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law's Potential But Limited
Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROWTH: SHOULD WATER LAW CONTROL LAND
USE? 57-94 (Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold ed., 2005) (describing the inherent and perpetual growth
bias in water law) [hereinafter WET GROWTH].
33. See, e.g., ROBERT GOTrLIEB & MARGARET F1TZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1991); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional
Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1993). See also NANCY BURNS,
THE FORMATION OF AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: PRIVATE VALUES IN PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
11 (1994) (showing that in 1987, the U.S. had 3,060 special local government districts devoted to
water supply, a 23.4 percent increase since 1977).
34. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2004); National Research Council, supra note 1, at 27-28; Vitale, supra note
1, at 1390.
35. See, e.g., DeLaughter, supra note 4, at 1472 (noting that in the nineteenth century private
suppliers of water could not meet the demands of the rapidly developing U.S. by cost-effectively
providing clean, reliable water to all local residents at a reasonable price). See also Gleick, supra
note 1, at 23.
36. Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 51-53.
37. Id.
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Ultimately, the public reacted to unreliable private supply of water by
demanding government provision of water services.
B. Current Status
1. The Trend Towards Privatization
Even though privately owned water supply companies constitute about
thirty-three percent of all community water systems in the United States,
they serve only about fifteen percent of the customers (measured in volume
of water handled), take in only about fourteen percent of total water
revenues, and hold only about eleven percent of all water system assets in
the United States.38 Nonetheless, in recent years privatization has become
increasingly attractive to many cities or government (or quasi-government)
water institutions, as evidenced by the growing number of contracts to
privatize water services. According to one report, from 1997 to 2000,
seventy cities entered into long-term contracts with private entities to
operate and maintain their local water supplies or wastewater systems. 39 As
of 1997, though, only slightly more than one half of the states had any
private contract operation-and-maintenance water systems at all, and the
bulk of those systems were in Texas and Puerto Rico, together comprising
over sixty percent of all such systems nationally and over forty-six percent
of the water supplied by such systems.4°
2. The Types of Privatization41
One of the most critical things to understand about water privatization is
that it takes several different forms. At the most limited level, a public water
supply entity may "outsource" responsibility for one or more specific
services normally provided by the public agency, such as billing and
collection, routine maintenance, environmental services, training,
technology upgrading and maintenance, procurement management, or other
such tasks.42 Contracting with private providers for specific services is
widely used, and not discussed extensively in this article.
38. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 2-3, 15.
39. Johnson, supra note 1, at 4-5.
40. The Reason Foundation, Privatization Database, Water Services, Table 1: Contract O&M
Water Systems, 1997, at http://www.privatization.org/database/policyissues/water-local.html (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005).
41. For discussions of the types of privatization of municipal water services and systems, see
National Research Council, supra note 1, at 15-23, 56-80; Gleick, supra note 1, at 26-28; Johnson,
supra note 1, at 1-2, 11-14; Haarmeyer, supra note 13; Vitale, supra note 1, at 1386-90.
42. Id.
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At the next level, a public entity may contract with a private entity to
fully operate, maintain, and manage its water supply system or some
significant portion of it (OMM contact).43 A third type of contract is the
design-build-operate (DBO) contract, by which a private entity agrees to
design and build needed water facilities and to operate them for the public
entity.44 These last two levels may be written as service contracts, licenses,
or leases, with some variation in the legal rights and allocation of risks
associated with each. Nonetheless, in both types of arrangements the city or
public entity retains ownership of its water system. In addition, the city is
often involved in financing of infrastructure development and improvements
due to the tax advantages of tax-exempt municipal bonds, but with the
expertise and cost-efficiencies of the private participant. In notable yet rare
examples involving Atlanta, Tampa, and Cranston, Rhode Island, a city may
enter into a design-build-own-operate-transfer (DBOOT) contract, in which
the private entity finances and engages in the design, building, and operation
of the facility as a private owner, and then transfers it to the city at a
particular time.4 5 DBOOT contracts place more of the risk on the private
entity than do DBO contracts. The final type of privatization is a sale of an
existing municipal or water district water system, or some of its assets, to a
private firm.
3. The Forces Pushing Privatization
The forces behind privatization are numerous. Municipalities face
significant financial limits in making the enormous investments required to
meet both public demands for water and regulatory requirements regarding
the quality of drinking water and treatment of wastewater.46 Much of the
current water service infrastructure in the United States is aging or obsolete.
The American Water Works Association estimates the necessary investment
in replacing water infrastructure in the U.S. to be $250 billion over the next
thirty years.47 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency estimates needed
infrastructure investment to be $140 billion over the next twenty years.48
Two significant reasons for the large investments needed in water
systems are the failure of municipalities and public entities to make major
investments during the life of aging facilities (often due to other demands for
public finance, the desire to keep water rates low, and limited legal and
financial capacity to engage in debt-financing), 49 and the increasingly
stringent federal requirements for drinking water quality under the Safe
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 21.
46. See generally id. at 3-4, 18-19; Harrer, supra note 1; Lavelle, supra note 3; Maggs, supra
note 3; Ted Sherman, Liquid Assets - For Those Seeking New Markets, Water Systems Are a
Potential Money Machine, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 1, 2003, at 27; Vitale, supra note 1.
47. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 3.
48. Id. at 18.
49. See sources cited supra note 29.
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Drinking Water Act. Many small and medium sized publicly-owned
utilities (i.e., serving populations of 50,000 or less) lack the financial
capacity and scale of operations to make the imminent investments required
without immediate, severe rate increases for water service (and in some
cases lack the capacity to engage in such large capital improvements even
with immediate, severe rate increases). 5' Private firms, generally
subsidiaries of large multinational or national water corporations, may have
the financial strength, construction efficiencies, and operational economies-
of-scale to upgrade and operate public water supplies through design, build,
and operate (DBO) contracts more efficiently than public entities.
Another force behind privatization was a change in the tax treatment of
private operation of municipal water systems. Historically, public water
systems have had a tax advantage over private water systems, because of the
tax-exempt status of interest on state and local bonds. 52 The advantage
ranges from two to three percentage points. 53 If a private entity purchased or
even entered into a contract to operate a public water supply funded by
public tax-exempt bonds, the tax benefits would be lost.54 There was an
exception for five-year operation and maintenance contracts, provided that
the contract included a termination clause allowing cancellation after three
years. 55 Three-year contracts provide insufficient incentives for many firms
to operate facilities financed with tax-exempt bonds.
However, in 1997, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue
Procedure 97-13, which maintains the tax-exempt status of bonds financing
public water works that are subject to private operation and maintenance
56
contracts for up to twenty years in length. Under the new rules, though, a
contractor may not share in any net profits from their operation of the water
system and may share in cost savings or revenue enhancements, but not
both. 57 These limits are designed to prevent abuse of tax-exempt financing
of public water supplies.58 There is some discussion in Washington, D.C. of
possible changes to the Internal Revenue Code to allow more equal
treatment of private utilities and public utilities, but whether or not such
50. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300(0 to 300(j)-26 (1996); See also National
Research Council, supra note 1, at 3, 37, 47-48; Correll, supra note 3; Lavelle, supra note 3; Vitale,
supra note 1, at 1382-84.
51. See sources cited supra note 29.
52. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2004).
53. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 27-28.
54. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1) (2004); I.R.C. § 141 (2004).
55. Treas. Reg. § 1.141-7(c), (f) (2002).
56. Rev. Proc. 97-13, 1997-1 C.B. 632.
57. Id.
58. Id.
changes will occur is merely speculative. 59  A major change in the tax
treatment of water utility financing could result in even greater privatization
of water services in the United States.
Similarly, Executive Order 12803, signed by President Bush in 1992,
abolished the requirement that private firms have to repay the federal
government in full for federal investments in public infrastructure that is
subsequently sold to a private firm.
60
In addition, many private water suppliers that have promoted
privatization of municipal water services have highlighted their predictions
of lower operating costs and increased operating efficiencies when making
proposals, and have pointed to their successes in achieving lower operating
costs and increased operating efficiencies with other public water systems.R
As discussed below in Part IV (B), a comprehensive review of the evidence
as to whether private water suppliers or public water suppliers in the United
States are more efficient than the other is inconclusive. However, it is clear
that some private firms can operate some public water supply systems
substantially more efficiently than the government entities that have been or
were operating them. For example, a National Association of Water
Companies study of twenty-nine water privatizations showed operating cost
savings from ten to forty percent, sometimes avoiding planned rate increases
and providing more funds for capital improvements.
62
Furthermore, even where localities have not privatized water services,
privatization has had beneficial effects by creating competitive incentives for
public water managers to improve 6erformance and efficiencies and
providing benchmarks for performance.
Finally, the 1980's to the present have seen a surge in political forces
favoring privatization generally and a decreased role for government.
64
Private-market advocates like the Reason Foundation have produced policy
reports and studies supporting increased privatization of many government
functions, including public water supply and wastewater treatment
65services. Their arguments, often grounded in a combination of economicand political theory, have been supported by political leaders sympathetic to
59. See, e.g., 2001 TNT 150-24; 98 TNT 85-102; 98 TNT 85-101. See also National Research
Council, supra note 1, at 28; Vitale, supra note 1, at 1391, 1393.
60. Exec. Order No. 12,803, 3 C.F.R. 296 (1993).
61. See, e.g., United Water, supra note 6; Elizabethtown Water Company, Privatization
Successes, available at http://www.sap.com/industries/utilities/pdf/50025902.pdf (last visited Feb.
3, 2005) (explaining in an illustrated twelve page brochure the actions and ultimate successes of
Elizabethtown Water).
62. National Association of Water Companies, Public Water Supply Facts (1999) (on file with
the author).
63. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 4, 58-59; Monica Maldonado, Public Water in
Private Hands, 67(1) CIV. ENG'G 49 (1997).
64. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON PRIVATIZATION, supra note 4; sources cited supra
note 13.
65. See sources cited supra notes 7, 13.
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reducig government, bolstering the private sector, or stretching public
funds.
4. The Response to Privatization
Nonetheless, the trend towards privatization has suffered some major
setbacks recently. Most notably, in 2003, Atlanta retook control of its water
system from United Water after 4 years of complaints about poor quality of
service, maintenance backlogs, and a rate increase. 67 Atlanta's privatization
experiment was largely seen as a test of whether privatization of large urban
68water systems would work well. In 2003, Phoenix's decision to privatize
part of its water system fell apart when its top bidder encountered financial
problems due to its parent company's top executives looting the company.69
In 2000, Indianapolis moved to condemn by eminent domain its water
utility, which had been privately owned since 1881, but it also contracted out
operation of the system to a private firm (i.e., a move from private
ownership to public ownership with private operation). 70  Lexington-
Fayette's (Kentucky) combined city-county government has made moves
towards repurchasing its local water facilities from American Water Works,
which has mounted a public relations campaign opposing the effort.
71
66. See, e.g., National Research Council, supra note 1, at 19; Luoma, supra note 3; Maggs, supra
note 3; Mays, supra note 4; Sherman, supra note 46; Vitale, supra note 1, at 1384.
67. Milo Ippolito, Atlanta Takes Over Water System, Huge Utility With Aging Pipes Back Under
City Control, ATLANTA J. CONST., Apr. 30, 2003, at B5.
68. For the history of Atlanta's woes with United Water, see supra note 67; Martha Carr, Water
Woes in Atlanta a Cautionary Tale for N.O.; Privatizing Doable, Not Cure-All, City Told, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, June 29, 2003, at 01; Maggs, supra note 3; D.L. Bennett, Water Utility
Equipment to Go on Auction Block, Atlanta to Bid on Backhoes, Trucks, Chairs, ATLANTA J.
CONST., July 30, 2003, at B4; D.L. Bennett, Auction No Winner for City Bids High on United Water
Equipment, ATLANTA J. CONST., Aug. 7, 2003, at JN3; Tedra DeSue, Water Rates May Rise to
Cover Debt, Atlanta Mayor Warns, BOND BUYER, Oct. 16, 2003, at 4; Colin Campbell, There's No
Pot of Gold in More Privatization, ATLANTA J. CONST., Nov. 2, 2003, at E2; Tedra DeSue,
Atlantans Beg City Council Not to Impose Huge Water Rate Hike, BOND BUYER, Dec. 2, 2003, at
36; Ty Tagami, City Council Guts Sewer Rate Plan, ATLANTA J. CONST., Dec. 2, 2003, at Al;
Harrer, supra note 1; Johnson & Moore, supra note 7; Lavelle, supra note 3; Luoma, supra note 3;
Sherman, supra note 46.
69. Tom Zoellner, Privatizing Water Hits Roadblock, Firm's Finances Put Phoenix Deal at Risk,
ARIZ. REPUBLIC, June 9, 2003, at B1; Tom Zoellner, Water Plant Verdict Today; Phoenix Council
Will Decide on Privatizing Supply, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, July 3, 2003, at B4.
70. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 24; Maggs, supra note 3.
71. Public Citizen, Reclaiming Public Assets, supra note 14; Harrer, supra note 14; Anthony
Lenze, Liquid Assets, PITT. POST-GAzETTE, Sept. 16, 2003, at C12; Teresa Ann Isaac, Our Water
Company... Our Profits, Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov't (Dec. 2, 2003), at http://www.
Ifucg.com/mtc/watercompany.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Coalition Against a Government
Takeover, Kentucky-American Water Company vs. A Forced Government Takeover: Facts About a
Simple Choice (on file with author).
In 2002, the New Orleans Water and Sewerage Board rejected a
proposal to privatize its water and sewer system under strong pressure from
citizen groups concerned about service and cost to low-income city
residents, impact on city employees, compromise of environmental
standards, and other public-impact issues.72 The Mayor of New Orleans has
replaced two Board members and a second effort at privatization is
underway, but it remains bogged down in public opposition.
Residents of Elizabethtown, New Jersey attempted to defeat the
privatization of municipal water supply by a voter referendum, but a New
Jersey court held that the state statute governing privatization of public water
supplies evidenced a legislative intent that these decisions not be subject to
public referendum. 74  However, a citizens' group was successful in
overturning Stockton, California's water privatization contract for failure to
complete an environmental impact report as required by the California
Environmental Quality Act.75  Following approval of Stockton's contract
with OMI/Thames in February 2003, the voters of Stockton passed an
initiative requiring that an' new water privatization contracts be submitted
to the voters for approval.
Likewise, residential customers in the Santa Margarita Water District
strongly opposed a proposal to pnivatize the district, serving suburban areas
in Orange County, California. The opposition arose even after allegations of
corruption among the public water district's directors, which were addressed
with institutional changes. The residents/customers were concerned that a
72. Public Citizen, The Big Greedy, supra note 14; Sherman, supra note 46; S&WB Seeking
Public's Feedback; Input to Help Shape Privatization Plan, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July
19, 2003, at 08; Martha Carr, Forum Speakers Oppose Privatizing S&WB: Local Control Called
Important, NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 23, 2003, at 01; Urban Conservancy, Overview -
Privatization of the Sewerage and Water Board, at http://www.urbanconservancy.org/swb/overview
091102.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Geoffrey F. Segal, New Orleans Water Proposals Rejected,
Reason Foundation (Dec. 2002), at http://www.rppi.org/neworleanswater.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2005); Press Release, Public Citizen, Statement of Wenonah Hunter, Consumer Groups Champion
Defeat of New Orleans Privatization Bids (Oct. 16, 2002), available at http://www.citizen.org/
pressroom/release.cfm?ID=1241 (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
73. Martha Carr, Water, Sewer Plan Called Fatally Flawed; But Privatization Isn't Dead Yet,
NEW ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Sept. 3, 2003, at 01; Urban Conservancy, supra note 53, available
at http://www.urbanconservancy.org/swb/overview09102.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
74. See We the People Comm., Inc. v. City of Elizabethtown, 739 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1999).
75. Concerned Citizens Coalition v. City of Stockton, Case No. CV 020397, ruling on pet. for
mandamus (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003); California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West 2004). For a history of the Stockton controversy, see Public Citizen,
Thirsting for Profits, supra note 14; Brian Skoloff, Stockton Water Deal Stirs Privatization Ire,
CONTRA COSTA TIMES (Walnut Creek, CA), Mar. 30, 2003, at 4. See also "Concerned Citizens"
Ask Courts to Stop Stockton OMI-Thames Deal, at http://www.waterindustry.org/New%20Projects/
stockton-ca-19.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); OMI-Thames Stockton Privatization Stopped by
Superior Court, available at http://www.waterindustry.org/New%20Projects/stockton-ca-20.htm
(last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Stockton Water Privatization Ruling a "Victory" for Democracy, Oct. 27,
2003, at http://www.pacinst.org/topics/water and-sustainability/water-privatization/stockton/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005); Maggs, supra note 3.
76. OMI-Thames Stockton Privatization Stopped by Superior Court, available at http://www.
waterindustry.org/New%20Projects/stockton-ca-20.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
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lack of oversight by the California Public Utilities Commission and the
monopoly characteristics of a water provider would result in poorer service
for higher costs. As a result, the Orange County Local Agency Formation
Commission (LAFCO) voted to reject the privatization proposal.
Nationally, various environmental groups and social justice groups have
expressed concerns about water privatization in the United States, prepared
studies, and called for greater public scrutiny and control. 8
III. LEGAL AUTHORITY AND LIMITS
A. Legal Authorization of Privatization
In general, most states have legal authority for municipalities or other
public entities to enter into contracts with private entities to supply water to
the public. Many states have statutes expressly authorizing the sale, lease, or
long-term operational contracting of public water works facilities.79
77. Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 57-59.
78. See, e.g., Gleick, supra note 1; Lenze, supra note 71; Texas Living Waters Project,
Privatization of Water and Wastewater Services, Issue Paper No. 6, at http://www.
texaswatermatters.con/pdfs/water.planningcommittee6.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Harrer,
supra note 1; United Church of Christ, supra note 14; Urban Conservancy, supra note 72; sources by
Public Citizen cited supra note 14.
79. See generally V. Woerner, Power of Municipality to Sell, Lease, or Mortgage Public Utility
Plant or Interest Therein, 61 A.L.R.2d 595 (1999), at § 3b (citing cases where state statutes
conferring power upon municipalities to sell public utilities have been held constitutional);
MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 10.05 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2001) (referencing statutes in Kentucky,
New Jersey, Texas, and Utah). See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10061 (West 2004) (authority to
lease, sell, or transfer municipally owned water service utilities); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30-35-
202 (West 2004) (power to sell public works and sell or lease property); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 26, §
215 (2004) (concerning the merger, mortgage, or transfer of public utilities property); GA. CODE
ANN. § 36-37-7 (2004) (authorizing disposal of public utility plants or properties); IDAHO CODE §
50-326 (Michie 2004) (providing procedures to the leasing and selling of water, light, power, and
gas plants); 220 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/7-102(c) (West 2004) (requiring commission approval for
transactions to assign, transfer, lease, mortgage, sell franchises, licenses, permits, plant, equipment,
business, or other property); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 8-1.5-2-29 to -32 (West 2004) (authorizing
waterworks leases); IND. CODE ANN. § 8-1-2-83 (governing the franchise, sale, transfer, assignment,
or encumbrances of utilities generally); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 107.700-107.770 (Banks-Baldwin
2004) (authorizing privatization of water and wastewater improvements); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
33:4341 (West 2004) (governing the sale or lease of revenue-producing utility property); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 216B.50 (West 2004) (providing restrictions on property transfer and merger of public
utilities); OKLA. STAT. tit. 11 §§ 35-201 to -205 (2004) (sales or lease of municipally owned public
utility); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 9-39-36 (Michie 2004) (granting municipal power to sell, lease, or
grant operating contract for utility); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 13.511-13.515 (Vernon 2004)
(granting powers to privatize sewage treatment and disposal); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-10d-I to -7
(2004) (allowing government projects for the private ownership or operation of water and
wastewater facilities and services); WASH. REV. CODE § 35.94.010 (2004) (granting authority to sell
or let any public utility works, plant, or system); WASH. REV. CODE § 54.16.180 (2004) (providing
575
The best source of legal authority for privatization is a comprehensive,
detailed state statute that not only specifies what types of privatization are
authorized, but also mandates specific standards, conditions, and procedures
to govern local privatization of municipal water services. For example, the
New Jersey Legislature enacted the New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private
Contracting Act,80 which provided clear legal authority for public-private
contracts for operations and maintenance or operations, maintenance, and
management in such localities as Allamuchy, Camden, Edison, Elizabeth,
Hoboken, Jersey City, Manalapan, Manchester, North Brunswick, Rahway,
and Wildwood, among others. However, many state statutes authorize
privatization and may even exempt a private operator of a public water
system from public utility regulatory review, without providing significant
oversight or limits on privatization in practice.
In other states, courts have historically upheld the inherent power of
cities to enter into contracts with private firms concerning public utilities,
with some significant exceptions. The powers of cities or other political
subdivisions to contract with private entities for performance of specific
functions like billing, certain maintenance and upkeep services,
computerization of customer records, and environmental monitoring are not
in doubt. 81 However, the lease or sale of a public water utility, or arguably
its equivalent, a long-term contract to operate, maintain, and manage a
public water utility - is a more complicated question without express
statutory authority. Historically, jurisdictions were split as to whether or not
a municipality or other public entity had the power to sell or lease a public
water works system without express statutory authority, although the
passage of statutes in many states resolved the confusion there. 82 A recent
Pennsylvania case reflects the trend of courts to allow sales, leases, and
long-term contracts, even in the absence of statutory authority, on the theory
that water services are a proprietary, not governmental, function of
municipalities and therefore can be transferred to private entities.
83
Nonetheless, there is some judicial authority recognizing a public trust in a
city's water system, prohibiting city officials from avoiding their trust duties
to the public by transferring their powers or duties to private entities.84
for the sale, lease, or disposition of properties, equipment, and materials by public utility districts);
see also Correll, supra note 3 (discussing trend towards state authorization of water privatization).
80. New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private Contracting Act, N.J. STAT.ANN. §§ 58:26-19 - :26-
27 (West Supp. 2004).
81. Mays, supra note 4, at 44 ("It is now well-settled that cities are free to contract with private
entities for the performance of governmental services.").
82. Woerner, supra note 79, at § 2b, 2e; MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. §§ 35.32, 35.36, 35.40 (3d ed.
1997 & Supp. 2001).
83. Boyle v. Mun. Auth., 796 A.2d 389 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2002).
84. Pikes Peak Power Co. v. City of Colorado Springs, 105 F. 1 (8th Cir. 1900); Huron
Waterworks Co. v. Huran, 62 N.W. 975 (S.D. 1895).
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B. Legal Limits on Privatization
8 5
State statutes may also impose limits on the privatization process. Even
though a comprehensive statutory system of public input and regulatory
substantive review of privatization contracts may preempt voter control over
privatization via public referendum, 86 statutory requirements themselves
may ensure public input. These statutes might include open government
laws, such as open meetings and open records laws,87 as well as statutes that
mandate particular procedures for public hearings on municipal or water
district decisions.88
State laws mandating assessment of environmental impacts of
government actions might also apply. For example, a California trial court
judge recently invalidated the City of Stockton's water privatization
agreement for failure to prepare an environmental impact report under the
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).89 The court's opinion
observed that private firms make decisions on the basis of profit motive, not
the broader set of informed planning objectives that must be considered
under CEQA. The court held that it was reasonably foreseeable substantial
changes to operations and facilities would be made under a privatized
arrangement that could affect the natural environment.
90
State statutory or constitutional limits on replacement of the civil service
workforce with private contractors91 might apply to water service
privatization arrangements. However, the recent use of such an argument by
Atlanta public employees against Atlanta's privatization agreement failed
because, according to the court, budget concerns necessitated privatization.
92
85. For a discussion of constitutional limits on privatization generally, see Clayton P. Gillette &
Paul B. Stephan 1m, Constitutional Limitations on Privatization, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 481 (1998).
86. We the People Comm. Inc. v. City of Elizabethtown, 739 A.2d 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1999).
87. See, e.g., Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 54950-54962 (Deering 1987 & Supp.
2003) (requiring generally public commissions, boards, councils, and agencies to conduct open
meetings); Texas Open Meetings Act, TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. §§ 551.001-551.146 (Vernon 1994 &
Supp. 2004-05). See also Peter G. Guthrie, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutes Making Public Proceedings Open to the Public, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1070 (1971 & Supp. 2004).
88. Both the Ralph M. Brown Act, sections 54950 to 54962, and the Texas Open Meetings Act,
sections 551.001 to 551.146 contain procedural mandates.
89. Concerned Citizens Coalition v. City of Stockton, Case No. CV 020397, ruling on pet. for
mandamus (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003); California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES.
CODE §§ 21000-21165 (Deering 1996 & Supp. 2004).
90. Concerned Citizens Coalition v. City of Stockton, Case No. CV 020397, ruling on pet. for
mandamus, at 4-5 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 17, 2003).
91. See, e.g., Colo. Ass'n. of Pub. Employees v. Dep't of Highways, 809 P.2d 988 (Colo. 1991).
See generally Featherstun, supra note 4, at 653-62.
92. Abedi v. City of Atlanta, 536 S.E.2d 255 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). See generally Mays, supra
note 4, at 44 (asserting that it is now well settled that contracting out municipal services does not
violate civil services of state constitutions).
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Furthermore, frequently private water contractors will agree to hire many or
virtually all, of the city's water service employees, making the argument
about impacts on the city's civil service workforce even harder to prove.
93
Perhaps the best example of a useful state statutory constraint on water
privatization contracts comes from the New Jersey Water Supply Public-
Private Contracting Act (Act).94 The Act is a streamlined, privatization-
promoting version of the more cumbersome New Jersey Water Supply
Privatization Act.95 The Act requires that any city or other public entity
seeking to enter into a contract with a private entity to operate and manage
local water services must follow certain procedures and meet certain
requirements.96  These procedures include public notice, access to
information, hearings, and opportunity to -submit written comments. 97 They
also include compilation of a detailed record about the proposal, including a
negotiated contract.98  Finally, they require submission of the proposal,
contract, and record to three state agencies, all of which review these
materials. Ultimately, two of these agencies must approve, conditionally
approve, or deny the contract. 99 The authorizing and reviewing agencies are
the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities and the Local Finance Board within
the New Jersey Department of Community Affairs, and the reviewing
agency is the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection. 100 The
criteria for approving or denying the contract include the financial and
technical capabilities of the private contractor; the reasonableness of the
contract terms; the protection of the public/water customers from risks or
subsidization of the contract; the financial terms for the city and impact of
the contract on its ability to repay its indebtedness; and inclusion of
statutorily required terms (i.e., subjects that must be addressed by the
contract).' 0  The three state agencies must make their reviews and/or
decisions within sixty days after receiving a completed application.' °2 This
process, while not addressing all the issues that arise with water
privatization, has worked well in New Jersey and could provide a useful
starting point to many other states as a model of review and accountability
mechanisms to guide water privatization.
93. See infra Part IV (K).
94. New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private Contracting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:26-19 to -
27 (West Supp. 2004).
95. New Jersey Water Supply Privatization Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:26-1 -:26-18 (West
2004).
96. New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private Contracting Act, N.J.S.A §§ 58:26-20 - :26-22.
97. Id. at §§ 58:26-23(a), (b), (d), 58:26-24.
98. Id. at §§ 58:26-23(e), - :26-24(b), (d).
99. Id. at §§ 58:26-24(f) - :26-25.
100. Id. at §§ 58:26-21 - :26-25.
101. Id. at §§ 58:26-25(c), (d).
102. Id. at § 58:26-25(a).
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IV. ISSUES IN PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC WATER SERVICES
A. Unique Characteristics of Public Water Services
Provision of water supplies and services to the public is not like the
typical provision of goods and services by private firms or even the typical
government function that can be privatized. Water service is unique in
several respects. First, a sufficient, clean, and reliable supply of drinking
water is a necessity of life. Moreover, most Americans are completely
dependent on a single local provider for their access to a sufficient, clean,
and reliable supply of drinking water. As history has shown, inadequate
planning and infrastructure, mistakes, or carelessness can result in risks and
harms to human health, epidemics, deaths, and declines of entire
civilizations. 1°3 Problems with a private water supplier's quality, quantity or
reliability of water supply to the public can have devastating consequences,
not be merely a market glitch.
Second, water is not always a renewable resource in practice. Depletion
of water resources result from: (1) groundwater extractions at a rate higher
than recharge; (2) contamination of both surface water and groundwater
sources; (3) diversions of surface waters that exceed flows from feeder
sources and threaten both water quality and the physical characteristics of
the water body; and (4) consumption patterns that exceed the capacity of the
water basin or the region to accommodate them.1°4 As a study by the Pacific
Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and Security points out,
water is not only an economic good but also a social good, and is not only a
103. See, e.g., J. DONALD HUGHES, AN ENVIRONMENTAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD:
HUMANKIND'S CHANGING ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY OF LIFE 31-33 (2001); National Research
Council, supra note 1, at 29-40; JUDD, supra note 29, at 32-34; Bakker, supra note 13; Fauconnier,
supra note 1; Lavelle, supra note 3; Fen Montaigne, Water Pressure 202(3) NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC 2,
2, 15-16 (2002); Jeffrey E. Richey, Spatial Techniques for Understanding Commons Issues, in
PROTECTING THE COMMONS: A FRAMEWORK FOR RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN THE AMERICAS 273-
91 (Joanna Burger et al. eds., 2001); Rosenblum, supra note 3; Charles J. Vorosmarty et al., Global
Water Resources: Vulnerability from Climate Change and Population Growth, SCI., at 284-88
(2000) available at http://www.geog.umd.edu/homepage/courses/639D/vorosmarty.pdf (last visited
Feb. 3, 2005).
104. See generally Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Introduction: The Fragmentation and
Integration of Land Use and Water, in WET GROWTH, supra note 32, at 1-55 [hereinafter Arnold,
Land Use and Water]; ROBERT JEROME GLENNON, WATER FOLLIES: GROUNDWATER PUMPING AND
THE FATE OF AMERICA'S FRESH WATERS (2002); DAVID M. GILLILAN & THOMAS C. BROWN,
INSTREAM FLOW PROTECTION: SEEKING A BALANCE IN WESTERN WATER USE (1997); SANDRA
POSTEL, LAST OASIS: FACING WATER SCARCITY (2d ed. 1997); MARC REISNER & SARAH BATES,
OVERTAPPED OASIS: REFORM OR REVOLUTION FOR WESTERN WATER (1990); David H. Getches,
The Metamorphosis of Western Water Policy: Have Federal Laws and Local Decisions Eclipsed the
States'Role?, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2001); Lavelle, supra note 3; Richey, supra note 103; A. Dan
Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western Water Law: From Urban
Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 163 (1999).
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renewable resource but also a non-renewable resource. 105  Private water
suppliers generally plan for return on their investment, not for long-term
public goals and interests.
Third, water service in a particular geographic area is typically a
monopoly.'0 6  Due to the costs associated with constructing systems of
acquiring, treating, and delivering water supplies to a local community and
the public interest in avoiding duplication, most states have granted
municialities or privately-owned water utilities monopolies in their service
areas. As a result, customers are often at the mercy of the water service
provider, who is constrained from charging exorbitant rates either by
political pressures of customer-voters if the provider is public, or regulatory
oversight of state public utility commissions if the provider is private.1°S
Lastly, a municipality's or water district's decision to shift from public
ownership and operation to private operation and/or ownership has the
potential for "sell out" of the public interest in a one-sided contract due to
political influence, unequal bargaining power, or corruption. According to
the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, "[a]
review of media coverage in competitive bid processes [for water
privatization] such as those in Birmingham, Atlanta, and New Orleans
reveals charges that political favors were granted in connection with these
bids." 1°9 Also, a review of several privatization contracts show widespread
divergence among localities as to the contracts' protections of the public,
scope and comprehensiveness, performance standards, and coverage of
issues like modification, termination, and dispute resolution. For example,
the text of Baton Rouge, Louisiana's fifty-year franchise to the Baton Rouge
Water Works Company is only three and one half pages in length, while the
operation, maintenance, and management agreement between Manalapan
Township, New Jersey, and United Water Mid-Atlantic, Inc. numbers
seventy-three pages plus attachments and a three-page amendment.1 10 The
105. Gleick, supra note 1, at 5-8; see also Bakker, supra note 13; Rosenblum, supra note 3.
106. LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE WATER BUSINESS: UNDERSTANDING THE WATER SUPPLY
AND WASTEWATER INDUSTRY 23 (1998). See also Sherman, supra note 46; Ass'n of California
Water Agencies, Briefing Paper on Stephen P. Morgan and Jeffrey I. Chapman, Issues Surrounding
the Privatization of Public Water Service (Dec. 1996), at http:www.acwanet.comlmediazone/
research/uscpriv.asp (last visited Feb. 3, 2005) (noting that water service is a natural monopoly, and
it is expensive and inefficient to have more than one service provider in a given geographic area).
107. See, e.g., Water Dist. Number 1 v. Mission Hills Country Club, 960 P.2d 239 (Kan. 1998)
(upholding exclusive right of water district to serve customers in its service area); Scenic Hills Util.
Co. v. City of Pensacola, 156 So. 2d 874 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1963) (discussing a state law that
authorized an exclusive franchise for the operation of water and sewage utilities); Alderwood Water
Dist. v. Pope & Talbot, Inc., 382 P.2d 639 (Wash. 1963) (discussing a statutory prohibition against
overlapping water districts, which carried the implication that one water district should not infringe
upon the territorial jurisdiction of another district).
108. See infra Part IV (C). See also National Research Council, supra note 1, at 86-96; Lenze,
supra note 71.
109. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 26; see also Luoma, supra note 3.
110. Compare Baton Rouge, La., Ordinance 3673 (Feb. 9, 1977) with Agreement for
Public/Private Partnership and Operation, Maintenance and Management Services for the Manalapan
Township Water Service Area (Nov. 15, 1996) and Amendment to Agreement for Public/Private
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length of an agreement does not necessarily reflect whether it protects the
public's interest in critical issues. However, it is clear that city officials
"sold" on a privatization proposal as a quick-fix to public infrastructure
financing and operating deficiencies may be less than diligent in protecting
the public's interest - and arguably the public trust - regarding municipal
water supply.
Given the unique nature of privatization of public water supplies, certain
issues are universally regarded as critical for localities and states to address
in authorizing and regulating water privatization. These are issues not only
identified by independent experts and skeptics of privatization, but also by
the private water industry and advocates for privatization.
B. Operational Efficiency and Capital Cost Savings
The issue that cities or water districts initially face when deciding
whether or not to privatize is whether or not a private firm will really save
money in capital costs and/or operations. The common - but simplistic -
wisdom among advocates for privatization, and perhaps even among some
policy makers, is that private firms both construct and overate water supply
systems more cost-effectively than do public entities. However, two
economists' comprehensive review of all of the empirical studies by
independent researchers comparing private and public water utilities in the
United States show inconclusive results. 12 Four studies found that private
utilities have lower costs or are more efficient, while five studies found that
public utilities have lower costs or are more efficient. Three studies show no
difference in costs or efficiency. 1 3  The economists note that the most
informative study illustrates that the size of the utility makes a difference,
with large-scale public utilities operating more efficiently than large-scale
private utilities, but small-scale public utilities operating less efficiently than
small-scale private utilities.
114
Thus, private utilities are not necessarily more efficient than public
utilities. Instead, the specific benefits of each proposed plan of privatization
must be analyzed. Although reports show cost savings of between ten and
forty percent, and resulting increases in capital available to localities for
Partnership and Operation, Maintenance and Management Services for the Manalapan Township
Water Service Area (Mar. 24, 1999) (all three documents on file with author).
11. Neal, supra note 1; Johnson, supra note 1; Vitale, supra note 1; Water Partnership Council,
supra note 7.
112. STEVEN RENZET-ri & DIANE DUPONT, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE OWNERSHIP AND
PERFORMANCE OF MUNICIPAL WATER UTILITIES 8-9, 15 (2002), available at http://139.57.161.145/
papers/2002_10_DDSR.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
113. Id.
114. Id.
infrastructure or other public goods, recent privatization experiences in the
United States demonstrate that the benefits of privatization vary greatly.
1 15
These variations depend on the size and scope of the city's water service
operation, the financial and political condition of the city government, the
potential for changing municipal management and operations to increase
efficiency, the private provider's size, financial condition, management
strengths and weaknesses, operational efficiencies, experience with similar
water systems, and corporate culture, the customers' consumption patterns,
and other factors.
There must be a careful scrutiny of assertions of proposed savings.
Private water suppliers or city officials committed to a privatization proposal
may predict savings based on faulty methods, inaccurate assumptions, or
comparisons to other privatizations that are incomparable. Two examples
illustrate the potential problems. First, the Reason Foundation issued a
study comparing the performance of three privately-owned water utilities in
California with ten government-owned utilities in California, which
demonstrated that the privately-owned utilities were more efficient than the
publicly-owned utilities." 6  The report has been used to argue for the
superiority of privatization generally. However, the report has been roundly
criticized as comparing "apples" and "oranges" in at least two respects: 1)
the government-owned utilities that were studied depend mostly on surface
water, which is substantially more expensive than the groundwater on which
the privately-owned utilities rely; and 2) ten different government units
together comprise the same approximate size of the three private utilities
together, thus meaning that each private utility has a substantially larger
scale than is typical of each of the ten government units.' 17 In addition, the
total sample size was small and region-specific.
Second, an independent review of the analysis performed by Alternative
Resources Incorporated (ARI) for Stockton, California's water privatization
proposal showed arguable underestimation of inflation based on assumptions
instead of historic figures. It also showed arguable overestimation of the
City's energy expenditures, using the energy crisis year of 2001-02 as a
baseline.11 8 Similarly, the review contended that capital cost savings were
overstated, because the entire system did not need to be privatized in order
115. Neal, supra note 1; United Water, supra note 6; Water Partnership Council, supra note 7;
Elizabethtown Water Company, supra note 61; Sherman, supra note 46. See also Marie Rohde,
United Water Delivering Savings in 10-Year Contract, MILWAUKEE J. & SENTINEL, June 16, 2003,
at 4A; see also National Research Council, supra note 1, at 10-28 (discussing a wide variation in
privatization successes and failures).
116. Neal, supra note 1. See discussion supra at Part n (B).
117. See discussion supra Part II (B); Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 57 ("Some argue that the
Reason report's comparisons between public and private utilities were flawed, since most of the
private utilities examined use groundwater as their main source of supply, while the public utilities
in the study use mostly surface water, which is more costly for transportation and treatment.").
118. Gary H. Wolff, Independent Review of the Proposed Stockton Water Privatization (Pacific
Inst. for Studies in Dev., Env't & Sec. 2003), at http://www.pacinst.org/topics/water-and
sustainability/water-privatization/stockton/stockton-privatization review.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2005).
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to capture most of the capital cost efficiencies associated with a treatment
plant expansion.
State legislation should mandate at least two stages to review of any
proposal by a municipal or public water district to privatize the operations of
all or most of its water service. The first stage is public opportunity to
comment on studies supporting privatization. This includes public access to
proposals, studies, and data used by the private water supplier, city, or
independent consultants to assess the need for and impact of the proposed
privatization. This first stage should allow for ample opportunity by the
public to review and comment on these studies and data in writing, and a
requirement that the governing body consider all comments and reviews that
it receives and address any substantial criticisms of data, support, or
methodology when reaching a final decision. The second stage is
substantive review by a state regulatory agency. This stage should require
that the proposed privatization be submitted for approval, conditional
approval, or denial by an expert state regulatory agency, including
assessment of predicted operational cost savings and capital cost savings,
proposed rate plans, and environmental impacts, among other factors. The
former is typical in California, with its strong history of public participation
and environmental impact laws, 120 while the latter is typical in New Jersey
under its water privatization statute.'
21
However, experience in both states shows that strict statutory time
frames should be imposed to prevent the review process from simply
becoming a process for defeat of privatization proposals by delay and
cost. 22 Worthwhile privatization proposals that offer increased efficiencies
119. Id.
120. See, e.g., Ralph M. Brown Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-61 (Deering 2004); California
Environmental Quality Act, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq.; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
425.16; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6586.5(a)(2) (Deering 2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
25398(d)(2), 25398.60) (Deering 2004); Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 492 P.2d 1137 (Cal. 1972).
121. New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private Contracting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 58:26-17 -
:26-18.
122. See, e.g., California Permit Streamlining Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65920 (Deering 2004)
(ordering mandatory statutory time frames for decisions on land use approvals, thus preventing
abusive delay); New Jersey Water Supply Public-Private Contracting Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:26-
13 (detailing a maximum 60-day review period for application, which is deemed approved if not
acted on within this time frame). For examples of studies on the costs and problems associated with
delay in government decision making, see, e.g., RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW AND PROCESS § 5.9, 200-01 (2d ed. 1999); IRA S. LOWRY & BRUCE W. FERGUSON,
DEVELOPMENT REGULATION AND HOUSING AFFORDABILITY 143-52 (1992) (documenting typical
processing time for rezoning, subdivision approvals, and building permits for eight counties near
Sacramento, CA, ten counties near Nashville, TN, and eight counties near Orlando, FL); RICE
CENTER FOR COMMUNITY DESIGN AND RESEARCH, The Cost of Delay Due to Government
Regulation in the Houston Housing Market, ULI RESEARCH REPORT No. 28 (1979) (studying delay
in housing construction due to utility district regulations); CHARLES THUROW & JOHN VRANICAR,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HUD NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON HOUSING COSTS, PROCEDURAL REFORM OF
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and better environmental and water quality performance should not be
stymied by process alone. While interested members of the public and
regulators need adequate time to evaluate proposed privatization, substantive
standards and outcomes - not red tape and procedural hurdles - should be
the barriers to poor proposals. At the same time, the process must be
sufficiently long and complete to allow a full and fair evaluation of the
proposal and contract terms. Many examples of failed privatization efforts,
such as Atlanta, involved rushed bidding and approval processes (in
Atlanta's case, due to the mayor's political ambitions), failure to gather and
evaluate detailed information, or failure to carefully negotiate and draft
adequate contract terms.1 23  In addition, another common theme of
privatization failures is that quick approvals raise public suspicions and
create ongoing public animosity towards the private water supplier.' 24 In all
of these instances, the costs saved up-front were greatly exceeded by the
costs to all parties of a failed arrangement.
C. Rates
Customers of a public water system, and their elected officials, are often
concerned with the impact of water privatization on rates for water service.
If the system were to remain publicly operated, customers would have
political influence over water system officials to keep rates reasonable
(although arguably perhaps below market costs). 125 On the other hand, if the
system were privately owned and operated, it would be subject in all but five
states to public regulatory agency review of rates to protect consumers from
excessive charges due to the monopoly situation and limited ability to reduce
consumption due to human necessity. 126 However, where the public entity
retains ownership of its water system but contracts with a private operator
and manager, the private firm may be setting the rates without supervision or
control from a state regulatory agency. In fact, several states have expressly
exempted such arrangements from state utility commission regulation. 127
The result is that the private entity may be insulated from any sort of
LOCAL LAND USE REGULATION 123, 126 (1979) ("Land use regulations are plagued by red tape
which leads to unnecessary, prolonged delay or inaction."); Comment, Participants' Experiences
with Habitat Conservation Plans and Suggestions for Streamlining the Process, 23 ECOLOGY L.Q.
369 (1996); Shirley Leung, Streamlining City Charter May Help Business in L.A., WALL ST. J., Feb.
3, 1999 (Cal. ed.), at CA1 (comparing length of time to obtain conditional use permit or zoning
change in Los Angeles with time in nearby cities of Anaheim and Burbank); Bette Sheldon,
Unheralded New Law Should Ease Developers' Delays and Frustrations, SEATTLE TIMES, May 28,
1995, at B7 ("Projects have been subjected to multiple reviews, resulting in costly and time-
consuming delays.").
123. For a history of Atlanta's privatization adventure, see sources cited supra note 68.
124. Id.; see also sources cited supra note 77 (chronicling public opposition to Stockton, CA
water privatization).
125. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 86-88.
126. Id. at 94.
127. Id. at 97-99; see also Ann J. Gellis, Water Supply in the Northeast: A Study in Regulatory
Failure, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 429 (1985).
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constraints in rate-setting, except as provided in the operation, maintenance,
and management contract with the city or water district.
The problem is not increased rates per se. Increased rates following
privatization may be the result of profit-seeking behavior by a private
controller of a monopoly without adequate rate controls,' 28 but they may be
the result of legitimate and perhaps necessary factors. Rate increases
following privatization may be due to costs associated with expensive
capital improvements, perhaps overdue system replacement and upgrade or
perhaps modifications necessary to meet increasingly stringent water quality
and environmental regulations. 9 Thus, rates would have likely increased
(or alternatively taxes if tax revenues were used to subsidize water rates)
even if the system had remained publicly owned and operated. Indeed,
surveys of water utility customers show that they would be willing to PaY
significantly more for water that exceeds federal water quality standards.
Rate increases may also be due to efficient and conservation-minded efforts
to price water at its true cost and to eliminate free-riding by nonpaying or
underpaying customers.' Marginal-cost pricing principles, metering, and
increasing block rate structures should be encouraged as means to promote
water conservation. 132  Finally, private entities that do not enjoy the
advantages of tax-exempt financing incur demonstrably greater costs
associated with carrying debt than do public entities, and these additional
costs may necessitate increased rates.'
1 33
The real issue is whether there are meaningful regulatory controls on
rate increases to ensure that they reflect legitimate costs and allow for a
reasonable return on investment, instead of exploiting the private
monopolist's powerful rate-setting position. One option is for all private
water companies owning or operating public water services in a state to be
placed under the regulatory jurisdiction of the relevant public utility
commission. A second option is for the terms of the privatization contract
(i.e., sales contract, lease, OMM contract, DBO contract, franchise
concession, etc.) to specify the standards for calculating or increasing rates,
128. See HYMAN, supra note 108, at 23 (stating that public water supply is a natural monopoly);
see also Lenze, supra note 71 (discussing rate increases when water services are privatized and the
practice of private suppliers using predatory pricing to win contracts based on their lower rates
during the bidding period and then raising rates after obtaining the contracts).
129. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 81-88; Lavelle, supra note 3.
130. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 43 (summarizing a study by the American Water
Works Association Research Foundation).
131. Id. at 86-87; Sherman, supra note 46.
132. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Water Management and Land Use Planning: Is It Time for Closer
Coordination?, in WET GROWTH, supra note 32, at 95, 98, 103-04. See TERRY L. ANDERSON &
PAMELA SNYDER, WATER MARKETS: PRIMING THE INVISIBLE PUMP (1997); POSTEL, supra note
104.
133. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 5, 88.
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or to attach schedules of rates that are applicable under different specified
scenarios. A third option is for the terms of the privatization contract to
provide that the public entity shall set the rates or that the private entity
cannot increase rates without the consent of the public entity. For example,
Manalapan, New Jersey's OMM contract, and Hawthorne, California's
lease, operation, and maintenance contract - both lengthy, detailed
documents, unlike some other water privatization agreements - provided for
some significant degree of municipal control over rates and rate increases.
34
However, it is advisable to have a legislatively required process by which a
state agency reviews all privatization contracts for operation/management,
lease, or sale to ensure that the contract provisions contain adequate
provisions governing rates and any rate increases.
D. Service Quality and Reliability, and Water Quality
The public's greatest concern, though - far ahead of increased rates - is
whether a private operator or owner of the local water system will provide
high quality, reliable service. The public cares about the quality of its
drinking water, including the presence of potentially harmful chemical and
biological contaminants, clarity, odor, and taste. The public also cares about
being able to count on a reliable supply of water, and efficient responses to
service calls or service interruptions. Often with privatization proposals,
there is a public fear that profit-seeking private companies will cut costs and
thereby reduce service quality or safeguards to ensure water cleanliness.
There is also a fear that a private entity with a local monopoly on water
services will not be responsive to complaints from the public, whereas a
public entity ignores its constituency at its own peril.
There is good reason for public concern based on some communities'
experiences with water privatization, even though many communities
receive clean, reliable supplies of water from private providers. For
example, Atlanta's debacle with United Water turned on quality-of-service
issues. 135  Tap water regularly ran a rusty brown color, and United Water
had to issue numerous "boil orders" due to insufficient water pressure
leaving the water unfit for human consumption without boiling.1 36 United
Water also had a maintenance problem with Atlanta's aged and failing water
delivery infrastructure, accumulating a backlog of 14,000 work orders by the
134. See sources cited supra note 110; Agreement for Lease, Operation, and Maintenance of Real
Property (Water System) and Lease of Groundwater Between the City of Hawthorne and California
Water Service Company (Feb. 27, 1996) (on file with author).
135. Lenze, supra note 71, at C12; Ippolito, supra note 67, at B5; Carr, supra note 68, at 14;
Maggs, supra note 3; Bennett, Water Utility Equipment to Go on Auction Block, Atlanta to Bid on
Backhoes, Trucks, Chairs, supra note 68, at B4; Bennett, Auction No Winner for City Bids High on
United Water Equipment supra note 68, at JN3; Desue, Water Rates May Rise to Cover Debt,
Atlanta Mayor Warns, supra note 68, at 4; Campbell, supra note 68, at E2; Desue, Atlantans Beg
City Council Not to Impose Huge Water Rate Hike, supra note 68, at 36; Tagami, supra note 68, at
Al; Harrer, supra note 1; Johnson & Moore, supra note 7; Lavelle, supra note 3, Sherman, supra
note 46.
136. See sources cited supra note 70.
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summer of 2002.137 A review of United Water's practices found that in
order to cut costs so that it could operate within its astonishingly low bid
parameters, the company was reducing the number of employees and the
amount of training they received, which arguably further compounded the
service delivery problems.
1 38
A facility in Santa Paula, California, was raided by federal authorities in
2003 because, according to investigators, the facility's private operator,
OMI, was violating terms of its discharge permit and had filed false water-
quality reports.' 39 OMI-Thames, owned by the German water conglomerate
RWE, has been fined repeatedly in England for violations of environmental
laws."40 Incidents of poor water quality or poor service evoke images of
private water companies operating in the nineteenth century in cities like
Chicago, Los Angeles, and San Francisco, which provided notoriously
inadequate water service for high rates, while making substantial profits to
the public's detriment.
141
One significant issue is whether private water companies have the
financial strength to perform their contractual and public obligations. For
example, in summer 2003 Phoenix had to eliminate a proposed contract with
Earth Tech to privatize some of the city's water service and to re-evaluate its
privatization goals when Earth Tech failed to obtain a letter from a bank
guaranteeing a $20 million line of credit. 142 Earth Tech hit financial troubles
because its parent company, the Bermuda-based Tyco International,
allegedly had been looted by former top executives for up to $600 million.
143
Another example was an attempt by the infamous now-bankrupt Enron
Corporation to form a private water service corporation, Azurix, in 1999,
and offer publicly-traded stock in the corporation.44 Azurix was unable to
compete with well-established multinational water conglomerates, and
within a little more than a year, it had lost $1 billion in market value and was
deemed a failure by Enron.
145
Despite the examples of quality failures among private water
companies, there is no evidence that private operators or owners of public
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Skoloff, supra note 77. A private sewer operator in Ellijay, Georgia also falsified water
quality records for at least three years. Ellen Dannin, To Market, To Market: Legislating
Privatization and Contracting, 60 MD. L. REv. 249, 254 (2001) (quoting Don Rudd, Will
Privatization Cause Costs to Soar?, ST. Louis POST. DISPATCH, Nov. 26, 1887, at B7).
140. Skoloff, supra note 77; see Harter, supra note 1.
141. Gleick, supra note 1, at 23; Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 51-53.
142. Zoellner, supra note 69, at BI, B4.
143. Id.
144. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 25 (Box 1-4).
145. Id. More generally, the financial viability of some private water ventures can be
questionable. Lavelle, supra note 3.
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water systems inevitably produce worse results regarding water quality and
reliability than do government operators and owners of public water
systems. In some notable examples, privatization has brought improved
service over what the public entity was able to provide.14  Often
privatization is a means by which revenue-strapped localities can finance
water system infrastructure improvements that are needed to comply with
the federal Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). 147  In addition, private
operators and owners of public water systems are required to comply with
the SDWA, just as are public operators and owners, and are subject to
federal and state enforcement. 148  Privatization highlights the need for
strong, effective enforcement of the SDWA.
Nonetheless, the concerns over whether a profit-motivated, cost-cutting
private water company will provide reliable, clean water to the public
necessitate three approaches to water privatization. One is for the local
governmental entity that is considering privatization bids to obtain
comprehensive, detailed information about the bidders' qualifications,
financial and operational capacity, and history of performance and
environmental compliance with other communities. Public officials should
carefully scrutinize and thoroughly question information that selectively
highlights successes, but does not systematically identify performance in all
systems operated by the bidder. EPA databases offer independent sources of
information about SDWA compliance. 149  Public officials should also
demand information regarding the financial practices, performance history,
and environmental compliance history of the parent company of each bidder.
This is crucial because the parent company's practices tend to influence and
shape the practices of their subsidiaries, especially if the subsidiary has
recently been acquired recently and is undergoing changes in structure,
corporate culture and practices, and standard operating procedures. For
example, if a community's water system operations were ultimately
governed by a corporation like Enron, the ultimate impact on the public
might be disastrous.
A second approach is for the local governmental to establish clear
performance standards in the terms of the contract, enforceable by penalties
for failing to meet baseline standards and enhanced by incentives for
146. See sources cited supra note 3.
147. See sources cited supra note 47.
148. Safe Drinking Water Act of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f(l)(A), (2), (4)(A), (5), & 300g (1996);
see also National Research Council, supra note 1, at 37, 91.
149. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Local Drinking Water Information, available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/dwinfo.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, Notices of Violation, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/novs/ (last
visited Feb. 3, 2005); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Civil Enforcement: Cases and
Settlements, available at http://cfpub.epa.gov/compliance/resources/cases/civil (last visited Feb. 3,
2005); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Criminal Enforcement: Cases and Settlements,
available at http://www.epa.gov/compliancelresources/casescriminallindex.htm (last visited Feb. 3,
2005); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Drinking Water Data and Databases, available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/databases.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, Safe Drinking Water Information System/State Version, available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/sdwis-ststate.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
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exceeding standards by specified levels or degrees. The contract should
contain provisions for modification or termination of the arrangement if
failure to meet standards occurs frequently enough as to constitute a
substantial breach of the contract. For this reason, privatization
arrangements of leasing, DBO contracts, and OMM contracts are preferable
to outright sale of a public water system to a private entity.
A third approach is to require the private operator to establish a well-
designed system for receiving and responding to customer complaints. At
the same time, the public entity should recognize that it will receive far more
complaints, including first-contact complaints, from upset customers than
will the private entity, especially in the first two years following the
commencement of the private arrangement. Prior to the commencement of
the private arrangement, the public entity should establish a system to
receive customer/public complaints about water service and then forward
them to the private operator. In addition, the private operator should be
required to submit to public officials monthly summary reports on the types
of complaints received, their resolution, and the speed with which they were
resolved. With this reporting requirement, public officials will be able to
monitor progress towards performance goals and potential problems before
they grow.
E. Take-or-Pay Contracts
Some private water utilities are advocating take-or-pay contracts, in
which the city is obligated to pay for a minimum amount of water usage,
regardless of whether consumers actually use that minimum amount.
150
Although these take-or-pay provisions are designed to minimize risk to the
private provider from losses due to market-based, rate-based, or
conservation-based dips in consumer demand, they discourage conservation
of water resources.' Promotion of conservation and discouragement of
waste is a matter of state law and state water policy in many jurisdictions. 152
150. Texas Living Waters Project, supra note 80 (recommending the careful evaluation of "take-
or-pay" contracts for raw water or water services); see also RONNIE COHEN ET AL., ENERGY DOWN
THE DRAIN: THE HIDDEN COSTS OF CALIFORNIA'S WATER SUPPLY 13 (2004).
151. Texas Living Waters Project, supra note 80; see also GLEICK, supra note 1, at 31; COHEN,
supra note 150.
152. The State of California enacted legislation granting the state the power to implement water
conservation programs during times of shortage. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 350-78 (West 2004). The
State also enacted legislation for conservation, development, and utilization of State water resources
generally. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10000-12995 (West 2004). Other states have enacted water
resources legislation to encourage conservation. See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-96-101 - 37-98-
104 (2003); FLA. STAT. ch. 373 (2003). Also refer to the following cases, requiring that water be
used reasonably and not wastefully: Imperial Irrigation Dist. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 275
Cal. Rptr. 250 (Ct. App. 1990); People ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. Forni, 126 Cal. Rptr.
851 (Ct. App. 1976); Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 45 P.2d 972 (Cal.
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Demand for water resources is high and growing, while supply in many parts
of the country - at one time the arid West, but now also parts of the East - is
limited.'53
Thus, take-or-pay contracts for municipal water supplies should be
prohibited or discouraged by legislation. Instead, cities and private
providers should negotiate a graded system of financial incentives for
increasing levels of water conservation and for decreasing levels of unbilled
or under billed water consumption (except for equity-based protections of
low-income consumers for basic household needs); these financial
incentives would reward private providers for more efficient, and ideally
decreased overall, use of water. However, these incentives should also be
tied to adequate planning for drought scenarios, because improved
conservation during wet years can result in "demand hardening," which is
the decrease of waste that can be cut during drought years.
154
F. Long-Term Capital Investment, Maintenance, and Public Agency
Capacity
Often privatization facilitates immediate infrastructure upgrades or
improved operational capacity. 55 However, privatization may hurt the long-
term capacity of a public entity to improve, maintain, or operate its system
after the period of privatization is over. The city typically no longer has
officials or employees who are well familiar with the management and
operation of a water system, unless the city hires the private supplier's staff.
Moreover, private firms have the incentive to invest in capital
improvements and maintenance only so much as they will produce financial
results for them during their period of private control. 1 56 There may be little
forward-looking planning done to ensure conditions within capital
infrastructure necessary to meet public demands and regulatory standards in
the years following the end of the contract term, and cities may not develop
157adequate resources themselves to do so.
Thus, cities may become dependent on private water suppliers for
successive contract terms. One possible solution is to tie compensation of
the private operator at least partially to the operator's planning, upgrade, and
1935); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 336 P.2d 884 (Or. 1959); Dep't of Ecology v. Grimes,
852 P.2d 1044 (Wash. 1993). But see Janet C. Neuman, Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The
Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Law, 28 ENVTL. L. 919 (1998).
153. GILLILAN, supra note 104; GLENNON, supra note 104; POSTEL, supra note 104; REISNER,
supra note 104; MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER (rev. ed. 1993); Arnold, Land Use and Water, supra note 104; Joseph W. Dellapenna, Issues
Arising Under Riparian Rights: Replacing Common-Law Riparian Rights with Regulated
Riparianism, in WATER RIGHTS OF THE EASTERN UNITED STATES (Kenneth R. Wright ed., 1998);
William E. Riebsame, Geographies of the New West, in ACROSS THE GREAT DIVIDE: EXPLORATIONS
IN COLLABORATIVE CONSERVATION AND THE AMERICAN WEST 45-51 (Philip Brick et al. eds.,
2001).
154. Thompson, supra note 132, at 111.
155. See sources cited supra note 114.
156. See National Research Council, supra note 1.
157. Id. at 87, 102-03.
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maintenance activities that address post-contract water system needs.
Similarly, the contract could contain financial incentives to the private
operator, payable during the contract term, for continual planning, upgrades,
and maintenance with life-spans well beyond the term of the contract.
G. Environmental Protection and Impact
Several different environmental issues arise when the owner or operator
of a public water system is a private for-profit company.' 58  One issue
involves the protection of watershed and groundwater generally. There is
every reason to believe that private operators and owners of water systems
have incentives to protect the quality of the water supplies on which their
business depends. However, it is possible that a private water company
might cut corners on watershed and groundwater protections to save costs if
the impacts on the water supply were to be experienced in the long-run, not
the short-run. In contrast, public water agencies may be more accountable to
the public's environmental goals and demands.
A more specific manifestation of the first issue involves the sale and
development of a public entity's watershed reserve lands or groundwater
recharge overlay lands, which are set aside as natural open space to provide
buffers between developed lands and flows into surface waters and
groundwater and thus protect watersheds and groundwater sources.159 One
version of the problem is that the city or a public water entity generates
revenues by selling the lands to private developers. Another version of the
problem occurs when a private water company owns such lands, perhaps as
part of acquiring all or part of a public entity's assets, and sees the potential
to increase revenues by developing the lands or selling them for
development. Development, of course, increases impervious cover and
contaminated runoff, results in loss of important habitat and ecosystem
services, affects hydrology patterns, and diminishes open space. 16 Conflicts
over the sale and development of watershed lands have arisen in Connecticut
158. Id.
159. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 6; Arnold, Land Use and Water, supra note 104,
at 13-15; Vitale, supra note 1, at 1312.
160. See generally Arnold, Land Use and Water, supra note 104, at 28-31; see also AMERICAN
RIVERS ET AL., PAVING OUR WAY TO WATER SHORTAGES: How SPRAWL AGGRAVATES THE
EFFECTS OF DROUGHT (2002), available at http://www.smartgrowthamerica.org/
DroughtSprawlReport09.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
FEDERAL INCENTIVES COULD HELP PROMOTE LAND USE THAT PROTECTS AIR AND WATER
QUALITY, Report No. GAO-02-12 (Oct. 2001), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d0212.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); JOHN RANDOLPH, ENVIRONMENTAL LAND USE PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT 363, 373, 375-76, 404-06, 486-87 (2004); Monica G. Turner et al., Land Use, in
STATUS AND TRENDS OF THE NATION'S BIOLOGICAL RESOURCES (U.S. Geological Survey ed.,
1998), available at http://biology.usgs.gov/pubs/execsumV (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
and New Jersey, resulting in public opposition and government restrictions
on sales and development. 16 1 A Connecticut state statute prohibiting sales of
watershed lands to private parties was upheld by federal courts.'
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Another issue is the failure of a private water company to consider
impacts on the natural environment, including watershed ecosystem
services, instream flows, and aquifer health, when seeking inexpensive
sources of water.'63 Public water entities are guilty of the same thirst for
cheap water, as one can see with Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power's infamous appropriations from Owens Lake, Mono Lake, and the
Colorado River. 164  Nonetheless, L.A.'s agreement to vastly cut
appropriations from Mono Lake's feeder streams (contributing now to a
rising lake level and renewed ecological health) resulted in large part from
public (customer) pressures following a major public education and
advocacy campaign by the Mono Lake Committee. 165  This example
illustrates that while public water entities are not immune from acting in
environmentally harmful ways to provide plentiful, cheap water, they are
also not immune from public and political pressures to protect the
environment. Private water entities are more insulated from such pressures.
Similarly, private water companies may have insufficient incentives to
pursue conservation and reclamation projects because of the costs associated
with developing such projects and perhaps the loss of revenues if overall
consumption decreases. Conservation and reclamation are critical to make
the most efficient use of water and to ensure adequate in-stream flows in arid
regions with large populations that have rising demands for water.
Finally, when a local water supply is served by a private company, there
is less potential for cross-resource coordination by a single entity. In
contrast, when a municipality regulates land use and development,
implements water quality controls in its jurisdiction, and provides local
water services, there is a single entity to coordinate land use planning and
water planning. In numerous examples, coordination between public water
agencies and public land use regulators has resulted in controls on growth
(which would exceed available water resources) through limits on new water
161. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 104-05; Matthew Futterman, Watershed's
Development Rekindles Fight, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ), Feb. 4, 1999, at 017; Vitale, supra note
1, at 1392.
162. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co. v. Council on Water Co. Lands of State of Conn., 453 F. Supp.
942, 946-48 (D. Conn. 1977), affd 439 U.S. 999 (1978) (mem.).
163. See, e.g., Gleick, supra note 1, at 37-38; William Booth, Liquid Assets: Thirsty States
Turning to New Water Sources, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15, 2002, at A3; Sheila R. Cherry,
Monopolies on the Local Water Front, INSIGHT ON NEWS, Feb. 11, 2002, at 1819; Lavelle, supra
note 3. Indeed, California-American Water Co. was found guilty of illegally pumping water from an
underground river connected to the Cannel River, causing harm to fish and riparian habitat. Mary
Ann Milbourn, Water Company Taps River Source Illegally, ORANGE COUNTY REG., July 8, 1995,
at B04.
164. See HUNDLEY, supra note 32, at 121-71, 215-34, 336-62.
165. Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold, Working Out an Environmental Ethic: Anniversary Lessons
from Mono Lake, 4 WYO. L. REV. 1 (2004); Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Leigh A. Jewell,
Litigation's Bounded Effectiveness and the Real Public Trust Doctrine: The Aftermath of Mono
Lake, 8 HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2001).
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hookups.166 The integration of land use and water resources is a topic of
growing importance nationally and experimentation in state legislation and
local regulation. 167 Involving private water suppliers - which may have very
little interest in land use regulation and planning - presents something more
of a challenge than incorporating public water service agencies into such
coordination and integration efforts.
Two approaches may provide some measure of accountability in the
area of environmental protection when water services are privatized. One is
for the state legislature to adopt legislation, like Connecticut, prohibiting the
transfer to a private party of certain lands held for watershed protection or
groundwater protection. The other is for environmental performance
standards to be incorporated into privatization contracts. These standards
should include basic minimum standards that are required, and performance
goals for which there are incentives and rewards to the private supplier for
meeting. The minimum standards should focus on prohibiting degradation
of watersheds and groundwater sources. The incentives should focus on
increased conservation and reclamation, improved coordination of water
planning with local, state, and regional land use regulatory and planning
authorities, and decreased impacts on ecologically stressed water systems.
H. Global Commerce in Water
Much of the privatization of public water supplies in the United States
involves American subsidiaries of large multinational water companies. The
three major multinational water companies are the French corporations,
Vivendi SA (which owns U.S. Filter Services) and Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux
(now called Ondeo, which owns United Water in the U.S.), and the German
corporation RWE (which owns Great Britain's Thames Water and American
Water Works Company in the U.S.). 169
One issue raised by control over U.S. water systems by international
entities is whether local, state, or federal laws could prohibit the
international export of U.S. water supplies owned or controlled by
multinational corporations. International trade agreements like GAT17 ° and
166. Dennis J. Herman, Sometimes There's Nothing Left to Give: The Justification for Denying
Water Service to New Consumers to Control Growth, 44 STAN. L. REV. 429 (1992).
167. See generally Arnold, Land Use and Water, supra note 104; Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold,
Polycentric Wet Growth: Policy Diversity and Local Land Use Regulation in Integrating Land and
Water, in WET GROWTH, supra note 32, at 393-433 [hereinafter Arnold, Polycentric Wet Growth].
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-131d (2003).
169. Cherry, supra note 163; Clarke, supra note 14; Harrer, supra note 1; Sherman, supra note 46.
170. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 108 Stat. 4809 (1994), T.I.A.S.
1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194.
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NAFTA 171 leave the issue murky, turning on an interpretation as to whether
water is a non-renewable natural resource or goods in commerce. Legal
experts are split over whether the U.S. could prohibit the export of U.S.
water supplies internationally,172 but a U.S. Supreme Court case declaring
groundwater to be an article of interstate commerce does not help the case
for protecting domestic supplies of water. 173 Privatization contracts should
be drafted in such a way as to retain ultimate ownership of the rights to the
water in the governmental entity, even if the private entity manages and
distributes the water.
L Security of Water Supplies and Terrorism
Private control over water services, supplies, and facilities raises
domestic security concerns, especially in this age of terrorism. The domestic
water supply has received considerable security and anti-terrorism attention
by all levels of government since September 11, 2001.174 In 2002, the U.S.
Congress enacted the Public Health, Security, and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002, which requires public water
systems to prepare emergency response plans to address threats to water
171. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 19 U.S.C. §§ 3312-17 (2005), 32
I.L.M. 289 (1993).
172. Brian D. Anderson, Selling Great Lakes Water to a Thirsty World: Legal, Policy & Trade
Considerations, 6 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 215, 238-42 (1999); Milos Barutciski, Trade Regulation of
Fresh Water Exports: The Phantom Menace Revisited, 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 145 (2002); Sanford E.
Gaines, Fresh Water: Environment or Trade? 28 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 157 (2002); A. Dan Tarlock, How
Well Can International Water Allocation Regimes Adapt to Global Climate Change? 15 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 423,443 (2000). See also Gleick., supra note 1, at 15-20; Clarke, supra note 14.
173. Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
174. E.g., U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Water Infrastructure Security, available at
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/security (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Office of the Inspector General,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Evaluation Report, Survey Results on Information Used by
Water Utilities to Conduct Vulnerability Assessments, Report No. 2004-M-0001 (Jan. 20, 2004);
Tennessee Municipal League, Municipal Water Systems Face Potential Security Threats, available
at http://www.tml.org/TrC/2001/09-24-01/water-systems.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Alex
Nussbaum, Water Utilities Say Supplies Are Safe, Attack Is Unlikely, Sept. 28, 2001, available at
http://www.waterindustry.org/Water-Facts/private-water-safety.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Jean
Hays, Company Will Gauge Security of City Water, WICHITA EAGLE, Feb. 14, 2002, at LA; AWWA
Seeks Federal Support for Enhanced Water Utility Security; Security of Water Supply Essential to
Homeland Security, U.S. NEWSWIRE, March 20, 2002; Lukas I. Alpert, NYC Water System
Vulnerable to Attack, AP ONLINE, May 20, 2002; Patricia Wolff, Cities Find Safety Costly,
OSHKOSH NORTHWESTERN, July 25, 2002, at 3; Vicki Kemper, Flood of Money Targets Drinking
Water Security Sabotage: Supplies Are Considered Safe, But Utilities and Cities Are Spending
Millions, L.A. TIMES, July 28, 2002, at A20; Environmental Protection Agency: Water Security
Grants, PuB. WORKS, Aug. 1, 2002, at 8; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, EPA, Drinking
Water Utilities Advance Water Security, Jan. 29, 2003 available at http://www.waterchat.com/
News/Federal/03/Ql/fed_030130-01.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2005) Genevieve Marshall, Security Is
Watered-Down at Reservoirs, Treatment Plants, MORNING CALL (ALLENTOWN), Mar. 30, 2003, at
A 1; Deadline for Water Utility Security Assessments; Nation's Largest Water Supplies Required to
Submit Security Studies to EPA Today, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Mar. 31, 2003; American Water Works
Ass'n, Protecting Our Water: Drinking Water Security in America After 9/11 (2003), available at
http://www.awwa.org/advocacy/water security in america final.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005).
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supplies and to conduct and submit vulnerability assessments to the EPA.
175
Both public and private water systems have bolstered security, and many
states have passed legislation or implemented programs to enhance security
of the water supply. J7
The security concerns are often misunderstood by the general public and
even policy makers. Much attention has been given to protecting reservoirs
and large water holdings from introduction of chemical or biological
contaminants. 177 However, the amount of a contaminant needed to pollute
such large amounts of water, as well as the fact that such water is usually
held pre-treatment (i.e., treatment processes would eliminate any
contaminants), make this issue a virtual non-threat, according to experts. 78
Much less attention, however, has been given to protect water pumping and
distribution facilities. Although introduction of contaminants into
distribution pipes could pose a serious problem, the greatest harm could be
done by simply damaging pumping or distribution equipment, possibly
shutting down the supply of water to large parts of a city.' 9 The potential
for such an act is greater than one might expect if one considers that
terrorists aim to create public fear, panic, and chaos more than they do to kill
or injure the maximum number of people. It has been said that great harm
could be done by someone with merelY a hammer, screwdriver, and access
to water system machinery or pipes. An explosion at a key point in the
distribution system could cause even greater harm. 181
Private water suppliers, just like municipal and governmental water
suppliers, have called for government attention to (and funding for) security
and have engaged in heightened security measures. However, private water
companies usually operate with less transparency and accountability to the
public than do public entities. This fact raises three particular concerns
about private control over the public's water supply.
First, a private water system operator may have less of a close working
relationship with local law enforcement than would a municipal water
department or local water district. In general, public operators of water
systems are either under municipal control or closely connected to local
government, and therefore involvement of local law enforcement in
175. Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 594 (2002) (amending the Safe Drinking Water Act); 42
U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1996).
176. See sources cited supra note 174.
177. Hays, supra note 174; Kemper, supra note 174; Marshall, supra note 174; Nussbaum, supra
note 174; Tennessee Municipal League, supra note 174;
178. Hays, supra note 174; Kemper, supra note 174; Marshall, supra note 174; Nussbaum, supra
note 174.
179. Hays, supra note 174; Kemper, supra note 174; Marshall, supra note 174.
180. Marshall, supra note 174; Nussbaum, supra note 174.
181. Id.
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safeguarding water supplies and monitoring potential threats and local
emergency response and public health officials in responding to emergencies
is likely to be greater (recognizing, though, that some inter-departmental or
inter-agency communication within government can be quite poor). A
private company may be less likely to cooperate with local law enforcement
and emergency and public health officials simply due to poorly developed
lines of communication, unfamiliarity of local officials with the private
company's operations, or desires to keep confidential proprietary
information about private operations.
Second, private entities may be less likely to reveal information about
private operations, employees, breaches of security, and system security
status than public entities would. For example, when Congress was
considering the Public Health, Security, and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002, private water companies objected to submitting
assessments to the EPA, and instead wished merely to certify that they had
done so: Congress added provisions to exempt these assessments from the
Freedom of Information Act and unauthorized disclosure. 182 The conflict
over disclosing assessments to a federal agency illustrates a possibly
inherent tension between private interests in keeping water management
practices private and public interests in a well-informed, well-prepared set of
anti-terrorism specialists at local, state, and federal levels.
Third, it might be more difficult to ascertain if there are security
breaches or threats from a private company's employees. There is no reason
to believe that private companies on average have poorer employee
screening and background check systems than do public entities. In fact, the
private systems on the whole might be better than the public systems, or the
opposite might be true. What is at issue, though, are whether public officials
concerned with public water supply security have adequate opportunity to
check a private company's processes, practices, and safeguards. Both public
and private water service providers have access to certain water security
information that is confidential and not made available to the general public.
However, it is not clear how widely this information is disseminated
throughout large multinational water companies based in other countries, or
the degree of risk that an employee sympathetic to terrorists could access it.
Water privatization agreements should mandate that private companies
not only undertake standard security measures that are now normal for water
systems in this age of terrorism, but also fully cooperate with, and disclose
relevant information to, appropriate law enforcement and anti-terrorism
planning officials to ensure maximum security of local water supplies. In
addition, public officials should investigate the employee screening system
and internal security systems of a private entity with which they are
considering contracting, and satisfy themselves that such measures are
adequate.
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182. National Association of Water Companies, 2002 Annual Report, at 10.
[Vol. 32: 561, 2005] Privatization of Public Water Services
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
J. Equity
When ownership or operation of the public's water supply shifts from a
governmental entity to a profit-motivated private entity, there is the potential
that those in society who lack resources will be priced out of the market for
water, which is a necessity of life. Public entities are concerned with policy
considerations, social equity, politics, and impacts of thirsty low-income
residents on society.' 83 They have every reason to structure water services,
rates, and assistance programs so that water for basic human needs is not
limited just to those well-off enough to pay high rates. However, private
suppliers have few, if any, reasons to consider social equity in structuring
water services and rates, because social equity considerations do not
contribute to profits or operational efficiencies. Although there is some
evidence that officers and managers in private corporations occasionally
consider socially-based norms if the corporate culture includes these norms,
in most circumstances a corporation's primary interest in social equity is for
good public relations.1i 4
Therefore, the responsibility for ensuring that low-income persons are
able to afford privatized water services will fall on the public entity that is
contracting out, or selling its water system. One study notes that while water
and sewer bills can consume as much as twenty percent of a welfare
recipient's benefits, only nineteen percent of cities surveyed have a discount
rate, credit, or financial assistance program for low-income customers of
water and sewer services.! 85 In addition to the obvious reason that cities
may have limited resources for such programs, there is some evidence that
public providers of water services artificially hold down or subsidize rates
183. Bakker, supra note 13; Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 42, 45-46, 59-61; Rosenblum, supra note
3. See also Thayer v. California Dev. Co., 128 P. 21 (Cal. 1912) (differentiating between public and
private suppliers of water). However, there is also evidence that public water institutions serve
private interests and values. See, e.g., BURNS, supra note 34; F. LEE BROWN & HELEN M. INGRAM,
WATER AND POVERTY IN THE SOUTHWEST (1987); DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER,
ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN WEST (1985).
184. See, e.g., Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307 (2004); Faith Stevelman Kahn,
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L.
REV. 579, 670-71 (1997); Note, Finding Strategic Corporate Citizenship: A New Game Theoretic
View, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1957, 1969-72 (2004); Terry F. Yosie & Timothy D. Herbst, The Journey
Towards Corporate Environmental Excellence: Integrating Business Methods With Environmental
Management, Enterprise for the Environment, (June 1997), available at http://www.csis.org/e4e/
yosierpt.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2005). See generally Gleick, supra note 1, at 29-30 (describing
how "privatization may bypass under-represented and under-served communities").
185. Fauconnier, supra note 1, at 64-65 (stating that "only 28 out of 145 cities surveyed have such
programs" and that "[nlo programs exist at the federal level...").
for water services, especially for residential customers. 86 However, as rates
rise to meet new infrastructure needs and to reflect market pricing standards,
there is a critical need for low-income assistance programs. A portion of the
money that cities save through privatization should be earmarked for such
programs.
It is more cost-effective and less complicated for the city or water
district to set up with the private operator a system of low-income customer
assistance. This could potentially be done through credits on the customers'
bills, at the time of the privatization rather than after the private operation
has begun and/or rates have been increased. One way of public funding of
such assistance could be by offsets, i.e., reductions, in the payments of
income or franchise/concession fees from the private operator to the public
owner if an outsourcing arrangement is used, or through direct cash
subsidies to the private owner/operator if the system is sold. However, the
private water company must be contractually obligated to offer and account
for the low-income credits or subsidies in its water billing and collection,
under the terms provided by the city or district.
Another equity issue has to do with discrimination in service provision.
Several famous equal protection cases over the past several decades
involved racial discrimination in the provision of municipal services,
including water supply.187  In many communities, neighborhoods
predominated by racial or ethnic minorities were underserved by the
municipal water system.18
Presumably private suppliers of water may be less likely to discriminate
on the basis of race or ethnicity, because all customers, regardless of race or
ethnicity, contribute to the company's revenues and profits. However, this
theory may not always operate accurately in reality. Individual decision
makers within a business entity may make decisions with conscious or even
unconscious prejudices, unchecked by internal safeguards. 189  Or specific
186. See, e.g., National Research Council, supra note 1, at 86-88; Lavelle, supra note 3;
Rosenblum, supra note 3; Sherman, supra note 46. For a discussion of the nuances, merits, and
controversies of subsidizing water for basic human needs, see Gleick, supra note 1, at 31-34.
187. See, e.g., Dowdell v. City of Apopka, 698 F.2d 1181 (1 lth Cir. 1983); Hawkins v. Town of
Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), affd en banc 461 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1972); Johnson v. City
of Arcadia, 450 F. Supp. 1363 (M.D. Fla. 1978).
188. See generally CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WILLIAM FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE
TRACKS (1986); see also Robert Bullard, Residential Segregation and Urban Quality of Life, in
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: ISSUES, POLICIES, AND SOLUTIONS 76-85 (Bunyan Bryant ed., 1995).
189. IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER
DISCRIMINATION (2001); Regina Austin, "A Nation of Thieves": Securing Black People's Right to
Shop and to Sell in White America, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 147 (1994); Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of
Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109 (1995);
Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 817 (1991); Anne-Marie G. Harris, Shopping While Black: Applying 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to Cases
of Consumer Racial Profiling, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 1 (2003); Peter P. Swire, The Persistent
Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787 (1995);
Michael J. Yelnosky, What Does "Testing" Tell Us About the Incidence of Discrimination in
Housing Markets? 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1488 (1999); Stephen E. Haydon, A Measure of Our
Progress: Testing for Race Discrimination in Public Accommodations, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1207
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decisions about service may be economically rational but have a
discriminatory impact or effect. For example, because of years of neglected
facilities and lines serving minority neighborhoods, the costs of repairs or
upgrades may be disproportionately expensive to the revenues generated by
those neighborhoods: these failures to make the repairs or upgrades further
widens the gap between minority and non-minority neighborhoods. It is
important to remember that the lack of water and other basic public services
in low-income Latino colonias in Texas resulted from decisions by private
developers of those communities.'
90
The concern about possible discriminatory decisions or racially
disproportionate impacts of business decisions is that the constitutional
constraints on cities and public providers of water services may not operate
on private providers. The Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution
applies only to "state action," not private discrimination.191 The U.S.
Supreme Court's standard for private contractors providing public services is
vague and uncertain. 192 If the private entity performs a government function
or has a "symbiotic relationship" that is essentially a close partnership
between the government and the private contractor, the state action
requirement is met and the private entity will be subject to the Equal
Protection Clause.' 93  However, often state courts define the provision of
municipal water services as a proprietary function, not a government
function. 194 Federal civil rights statutes, which prohibit discrimination in
interstate commerce, might protect minority communities from private
discrimination in water service, but nondiscriminatory business reasons,
such as the costs associated with upgrading older minority neighborhoods,
serve as a defense to discrimination claims. 195 In short, it is less than clear
whether courts would mandate a private water utility to upgrade service to
underserved minority neighborhoods the way they have directed cities to do
so. 196
(1997). For evidence that private water companies prefer to serve wealthier sections of communities
and may refuse to serve poor areas, see Gleick, supra note 1, at 23; Bakker, supra note 13.
190. See Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO. L.J. 179 (1995).
191. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State
Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 503 (1985).
192. For discussions of state action issues in the private provision of public services, see Daphne
Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1169 (1995);
Mays, supra note 4.
193. E.g., Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference, 516 F.2d 1328, 1331 (3d Cir. 1975).
194. See, e.g., Boyle v. Mun. Auth. of Westmoreland County, 796 A.2d 389 (Pa. 2002).
195. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (equal rights under the law); Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2003) (places of public accommodation and employment); Fair Housing
Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2003) (housing and real estate transactions).
196. Nonetheless, a private provider of water services may have a common law "duty to serve"
that can be used to require equal service. See HAAR, supra note 188.
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Therefore, antidiscrimination provisions should be included in any
contract for the outsourcing, lease, or sale of water systems to private
entities. In addition, both parties to the contract should have frank
discussions about sub-areas, especially neighborhoods, within the system's
overall service area that have aging, inadequate, or sub-normal distribution
systems.
K. Public Employees
One of the most vocal concerns raised when a municipality decides to
privatize operation of its water system is what happens to the city's water
employees. City employees fear loss of their jobs or unfair treatment by the
private operator or owner. Effective opposition by the city's employees can
undermine a city council's decision to privatize its water system. For
example, even though Atlanta's city employees lost their arguments in both
city hall and the courthouse against Atlanta's privatization contract with
United Water, their animosity towards the arrangement resulted in a
consistently poor working relationship between the city and United Water,
negative oversight reports and audits, and ultimately the city's termination of
the twenty-year agreement after only four years. 197 Incidentally, United
Water had hired most, but not all, of the city's employees, but had begun
reducing the workforce in order to achieve necessary cost savings.1 98
Because the loss of city workforce is a major political, equity, and often
legal issue, most contracts for water service privatization provide that the
contractor will hire the city employees and will not eliminate jobs except
through natural attrition or under certain financial exigencies.
Interestingly, well-conceived privatizations can result in increased skills for
(former) city employees. However, one issue to consider involves employee
benefits, especially if the city has an unusually good set of benefits in
comparison to the set of benefits offered by the private water company.
L Public Opinion
As to the status of water privatization in the United States today,2°
privatization proposals have generated fierce public opposition in some
communities, while being well supported in other communities. Policy
makers are undoubtedly aware that turning control over something as
essential and publicly valued as the local water supply system from an
accountable government entity to a private corporation is likely to be met
with suspicion, fear, concern, and opposition. Privatization failure tends to
occur in communities in which pro-privatization local officials attempt to
circumvent public scrutiny and participation with quick decisions, as was the
197. See sources cited supra note 68.
198. Id.
199. Johnson, supra note 1, at 19; Johnson & Moore, supra note 7; National Research Council,
supra note 1, at 103-04; Maggs, supra note 3; Vitale, supra note 1, at 1306.
200. See supra Part R (B).
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case in Atlanta and in Stockton, California. 201 State legislatures have a role
in ensuring that the process of privatization: 1) is open and transparent to the
public; 2) has ample, but organized and timely, opportunities for public
participation; and 3) is limited by standards and conditions designed to
protect public health and safety, particularly the public's interest in a
reliable, clean supply of water at an affordable rate.
M. Limited Authority of Regional Public Water Institutions
In many circumstances in which a city or local water agency is
considering privatization, the private firm's advantage is not its investor-
owned status, but instead its capacity to bring the efficiencies of economies-
of-scale to the provision of water services. This is especially true for small-
and medium-size municipal water systems, but it can also be true even for
large-city water systems. An alternative to privatization is participation in or
partnership with a regional public water institution; a public entity that
serves a region, instead of a single city. Regional government-owned water
systems have tended to enjoy success, in part due to their economies of scale
and in part due to their water-specific mission and powers, freed from the
constraints of local multi-issue governance and empowered to aggressively
pursue water development and distribution.
202
Unfortunately, some states do not authorize the creation of regional
public water institutions, others grant only limited authority, and others
authorize regional institutions poorly equipped to overcome local political
resistance to yielding power and fears of regional government. For
example, one New Jersey case held that the North Jersey District Water
Supply Commission lacked the authority to contract to manage, operate, and
maintain the City of Bayonne's water system, because the state legislature
did not grant the Commission the authority to do so. 204 The court ruled this
way even though Bayonne could have entered into the same contract with a
private water supplier under state statutes.2 °5
State legislatures can encourage greater efficiency in operations,
increase sources of capital for needed water system improvements, and
promote healthy competition to private water suppliers by expressly
201. See sources cited supra notes 46, 53.
202. See, e.g., ROBERT GO'TTLIEB & MARGARET FITZSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER
AGENCIES AS HIDDEN GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA (1991); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Institutional
Perspectives on Water Policy and Markets, 81 CAL. L. REV. 671 (1993). See also National Research
Council, supra note 1, at 32-33.
203. National Research Council, supra note 1, at 90.
204. United Water Res., Inc. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 701 A.2d 434 (N.J. 1997).
205. See United Water Res., Inc. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply ComA'n, 685 A.2d 24, 25 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
authorizing regional water authorities as special-purpose governmental
entities with the powers to operate, manage, maintain, design, build, lease,
and acquire local water systems.
V. STATE LEGISLATURES' ROLES IN ENSURING ACCOUNTABILITY
State legislatures have an important role and responsibility to play in the
emerging trend towards privatization of municipal water services. 2° 6  The
benefits of private sector involvement in the operation, management,
construction, and perhaps even ownership of public water supply systems
can be great, but the dangers from lack of accountability to the public are
even greater.207  A comprehensive state statute, establishing minimum
standards and processes for local public entities seeking to enter contracts
with private firms to operate, manage, maintain, lease, or own public
waterworks, would greatly enhance accountability of the privatization
process to public interests and needs.
20 8
A comprehensive state water privatization statute would apply to any
governmental entity, including a municipality or a water district, that seeks
to enter into a contract with a private entity to operate, manage, maintain,
lease, buy, or own public waterworks. The statute would expressly
authorize such contracts. It would not need to apply to outsourcing of
specific operational functions of a publicly operated water system, unless all
such private outsourcing in the aggregate constitutes the majority of the
public entity's operations. This is because most states have existing clear
authority for outsourcing.
206. Professor Frug argues that the core problems with the provision of city services are
simultaneously (1) a policy preference for market, consumer-oriented privatization of services that
are by their very nature public; and (2) a legal preference for state power over local power, which
hampers the building of community and the body politic. FRUG, supra note 14, at 167-79. Frug
urges greater power and authority for local government for the purpose of building community. Id.
His ideas, although intriguing and compelling, require extensive change to the structure of our
government, legal doctrine, policy practices, and perhaps even social norms. In contrast, this article
focuses on the current reality of the trend toward privatization and the existence of state power to
control the adverse effects of privatization. Although embracing state power, (instead of local
power) to regulate (instead of prohibit) private supply of public services may impede structural
changes that could be far more important and have far greater impact, the likelihood of reaching
Frug's ideal is small and the current need for regulation that benefits the public is great. The bind
between pursuing an unattainable ideal or settling for a less-than-ideal, incremental, attainable
solution to public problems is a classic, persistent tension between the purist and the pragmatist.
See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 1, 27 (1993); MARGARET JANE
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES 63, 123-30 (1996); Arnold, supra note 21, at 325-26; Stephen J.
Schnably, Property and Pragmatism: A Critique of Radin's Theory of Property and Personhood, 45
STAN. L. REV. 347, 347-48 (1993). However, for an argument for a greater local government role in
integrating regulation and planning of both land use and water resources, see Arnold, Polycentric
Wet Growth, supra note 167, at 418-33.
207. For a more comprehensive discussion of the need for political accountability in privatization,
see generally Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
1507 (2001).
208. For recommended state statutory provisions for privatization by subcontracting public
services generally, see Dannin, supra note 139, at 249-314.
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The statute should neither expressly encourage nor discourage
privatization as a matter of state public policy. Instead, the ideal state policy
is to facilitate privatization of public water services where significant net
benefits can be gained by private operation of a particular public water
system and where appropriate limits, safeguards, conditions, and procedures
ensure accountability to the public interest.
In addition to express authorization of privatization contracts, the statute
should establish: 1) minimum baseline processes and standards for public
entity decisions to privatize; 2) minimum requirements and presumptions for
contract terms; and 3) state substantive review of privatization contracts
prior to final approval.
The general standard governing privatization contracts should be that a
governmental entity holds its water system in trust for the public. The entity
can enter into contracts only if it demonstrably serves the public's interest in
a reliable supply of clean drinking water at a reasonable rate and if the
contract is appropriately limited by conditions, restrictions, and safeguards
to protect the public interest. This standard could clearly be met in the many
examples of wise, well-negotiated privatization contracts that currently
benefit local customers of privatized water services, but would guard against
inadvisable or hasty arrangements that harm the public.
The statute should require a competitive bidding process in which the
top bidder is selected according to a pre-established formula of highest bid
price and best qualifications to run the local water system. The statute also
should establish basic procedural requirements that ensure transparency of
the process and opportunity for public input. The procedural requirements
should include: 1) public notice of the intent to seek bids for a privatization
contract; 2) public notice of public hearings to consider awarding a contract
to a specified bidder, i.e., potential contractor; 3) availability of detailed
information on the privatization proposal, impacts, contract terms and
qualifications for public review; 4) public hearings in which members of the
public have an opportunity to comment on the proposed contract; 5)
opportunity for members of the public to submit written comments in lieu of
testimony at the hearing; and 6) consideration by the government decision-
maker of the evidence, comments, and testimony received from the public.
The state statute should mandate the preparation of an Impact
Assessment and the submission by the potential contractor of a Statement of
Water Services Provider Qualifications and History. The Impact
Assessment should be prepared by the local government entity or its expert
consultant(s), and it should address impacts of the proposed privatization on
water system operations and efficiencies (including costs and capital
investments), water service rates, performance of water service obligations
(including water quality and reliability), the natural and human environment,
social equity (especially low-income customers and historically underserved
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areas), and the city's workforce. The Statement of Water Services Provider
Qualifications and History should be signed under penalty of perjury by an
officer of the water company, i.e., the private provider or potential
contractor. It should also provide an accurate summation of the status and
performance of the company and its parent company(ies) with respect to
financial health, operational efficiency, quality and reliability of water
service provided to public customers, compliance with applicable federal,
state, and local environmental and health laws (including the SDWA),
impacts on the natural and human environment, and breaches of contracts
with public entities (including any terminations of privatization agreements).
The statute should expressly prohibit take-or-pay contracts and transfer
or development of watershed protection and groundwater protection lands to
or by private entities.
The statute should require review and approval, conditional approval, or
disapproval of the contract terms by an appropriate state agency, perhaps
with input from one or more other agencies. The reviewing agency should
consider, among other things, whether the contract sufficiently addresses - if
necessary - the following terms: 1) clear controls over rates and rate
increases, such as requirements of local public entity approval and/or clear
standards governing rates; 2) clear performance standards governing the
quality, supply, reliability, and maintenance of water services delivered and
response to customer complaints; 3) establishment of a customer complaint
system and a monthly summary reporting requirement to the local public
entity; 4) incentives for planning, maintenance, and improvements for life
spans exceeding the life of the contract; 5) minimum standards regarding
protection of watersheds and groundwater; 6) incentives for increased
conservation and reclamation, improved coordination of water planning with
local, state, and regional land use regulatory and planning authorities, and
decreased impacts on ecologically stressed water systems; 7) a declaration
that water supplies remain property of the city despite management and
distribution by the private contractor; 8) requirements of security measures
(including employee screening) and cooperation with and information
disclosure to law enforcement, antiterrorism, emergency response, and
public health officials; 9) coordination of publicly-funded low-income
customer assistance programs with the billing and collection practices of the
private contractor; 10) antidiscrimination policies; 11) retention of public
employees by private entities, as well as standards governing employee
benefits and workforce reductions; and 12) standards for modification,
termination, and dispute resolution.
A system of effective public and state involvement in the consideration
of contracts with private water companies provides the needed
accountability in water privatization that protects the public's interest in
reliable supplies of clean drinking water at reasonable rates and in a clean,
healthy environment.
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